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HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY
STANDARDS INTO SMART REGULATION: ISO 140001
AND ONTARIO’S ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES
REGULATIONS
Stepan Wood* & Lynn Johannson**

I. INTRODUCTION
In June, 2007, the government of Ontario, Canada, released its longawaited Environmental Penalties (EP) regulations.1
EPs are an
environmental version of speeding tickets: financial penalties that may be
imposed by government inspectors upon discovery of an alleged
environmental violation, without having to prove the elements of an
offence through an expensive and time-consuming trial. The regulations
offer a small reduction in the amount of an EP if the violator had an
environmental management system (EMS) in place that conformed to the
ISO 14001 international EMS standard or the chemical industry’s
*

Corresponding Author. Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University, Toronto, Ontario and Vice-Chair, Canadian Standards Association Technical
Committee on Environmental Management Systems (TC/EMS) and Standards Council of
Canada Canadian Advisory Committee (CAC/SC 1) on the International Organization for
Standardization Technical Committee 207, Subcommittee 1 (ISO TC 207/SC 1). ISO TC
207/SC 1 is the international committee responsible for developing and maintaining the
ISO 14001 environmental management system standard. The views expressed in this
article are those of the authors personally and do not necessarily represent the views of
the Standards Council of Canada, the Canadian Standards Association, or the
aforementioned committees.
**

President, E2 Management Corporation, Georgetown, Ontario and Chair, TC/EMS and
CAC/SC 1. The same disclaimers apply as under Note 1.

1

Environmental Penalties (Environmental Protection Act), O. Reg. 222/07;
Environmental Penalties (Ontario Water Resources Act), O. Reg. 223/07. See also
Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Guideline for Implementing Environmental
Penalties (Ontario Regulations 222/07 and 223/07) (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for
Ontario, 2007).
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Responsible Care program. This article explores the implications of this
attempt to incorporate voluntary EMS standards into regulation.
An EMS is a set of management processes and procedures that allow an
organization to identify, plan for, and manage the environmental aspects
of its activities, products and services.2 Starting in the early 1990s,
national and international standards development bodies began to develop
EMS standards to offer comparability across organizations, sectors, and
jurisdictions. In 1996 the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), a federation of national standards bodies from around the world,
published the first edition of the ISO 14001 international EMS standard.
ISO 14001, which was revised in 2004, quickly emerged as the world’s
pre-eminent EMS standard. It has been adopted as a national standard by
Canada3 and more than 140 other countries,4 and has been incorporated as
the EMS component of the European Union’s voluntary Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS).5 As of January, 2007, almost 130,000 ISO
14001 certificates had been issued to private and public sector
organizations in 142 countries.6 Countless more organizations have
implemented ISO 14001 without seeking third party certification.
2

Environmental aspects are things an organization has or does that can result in adverse
or beneficial impacts on the environment. Environmental aspects include consumption of
energy, water and materials, generation of noise, emission of pollutants, transportation of
goods, and generation of waste. Waste is often the first environmental aspect considered
by an organization, because it is among the most visible and is often a sign of inefficient
operation. Where there is negative environmental impact, there is often lower
productivity and lost profit. It is this opportunity for cost savings and improved
efficiency that drives many organizations to implement an EMS.
3

CSA/ISO 14001:2004, Environmental management systems: requirements with
guidance for use (Mississauga, Ontario: Canadian Standards Association, 2004).
4

ISO, The ISO Survey of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Certificates, 2006 (Geneva: ISO,
2007). The figure is approximate because national member bodies have no obligation to
report their adoption of ISO standards.
5

Regulation (EC) No. 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
March 2001 allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a Community ecomanagement and audit scheme (EMAS), O.J. L 114 (April 24, 2001) 1-29. See also
European Commission, “EMAS – The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme,” online:
ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm.
6

Reinhard Peglau, “Worldwide ISO 14001 Update January 2007” (unpublished report,
copy on file with authors). The number is approximate, because data are provided
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ISO 14001 is based on a cyclical “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA) process:
An organization Plans to do something. It Does it. It Checks the results,
and takes Action to correct problems, prevent recurrences and improve
future results, all resulting in a process of continual improvement (See
Figure 1).

Figure 1. The Plan, Do, Check, Act Model.
Source: Lynn Johannson, Handbook on Green Productivity (Tokyo: Asian Productivity
Organization, 2006).

The presence of an EMS does not mean that an organization will never
have another environmental problem. It does not mean that an
organization will never cause a spill. However, a robust and credible EMS
can enhance an organization’s efficiency, productivity, environmental
performance and regulatory compliance by helping it to:
•

understand its environmental impacts,

voluntarily and there is no centralized system of reporting. The number of firms with
ISO 14001 certificates is probably much lower than the total number of certificates and
possibly as low as 55,000-60,000, because large organizations typically obtain certificates
at the individual facility level.

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

4

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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identify
cost-saving
environmental
improvement
opportunities,
set and achieve environmental goals,
identify and comply with its legal and other obligations,
systematically control those aspects of its operations that
cause environmental impacts,
monitor and measure its performance, take corrective and
preventive action when needed,
assign environmental responsibilities and ensure personnel
are competent to discharge them,
anticipate and respond to environmental emergencies, and
conduct regular and thorough reviews to find opportunities
for improvement.7

This article is not about the potential advantages or disadvantages of an
EMS, however. We can take it as a given that the Ontario government
believes EMSs offer some benefits in terms of improved environmental or
regulatory performance. Otherwise why would it have proposed any
penalty reduction for firms with EMSs? The question for this article is,
given the government’s acknowledgement of the potential benefits of
EMSs, how should it have gone about incorporating them into its
regulatory scheme?
Ontario’s draft EP regulations were released for public comment in
October, 2006 after several years of anticipation.8 Although the proposed
7

For empirical evidence of the impact of EMSs on environmental performance and
regulatory compliance, see Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potosky, The Voluntary
Environmentalists (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge, 2006).
8

The government released two draft regulations. One was made under the Environmental
Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19. The other was made under the Ontario Water
Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40. The operative provisions of the two regulations
were essentially the same. For purposes of discussion, this article will refer to the EPA
regulation. The draft regulations were accompanied by a guidance document and various
other supporting materials. See Draft Ontario Regulation made under the Environmental
Protection Act – Environmental Penalties (no date) [“Draft EP regulation”]; Draft Ontario
Regulation made under the Ontario Water Resources Act – Environmental Penalties (no
date); and Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Draft Guideline for Implementing
Environmental Penalties (September 2006) [“Draft EP Guideline”]. All were posted for
public comment on the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights Registry on October 6,
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penalty reduction for EMSs was a minor feature of the scheme and would
apply in just one of ten Canadian provinces, it caused a stir in the global
EMS standards community. What alarmed the international EMS
community was not that the government would offer a penalty reduction
for EMS adoption. This was generally welcomed. It was how the
government proposed to incorporate EMSs into the regulatory system that
caused concern.
ISO 14001 is a consensus-based standard that was developed and refined
through a delicate, decade-long international negotiation process. It has
been implemented by more than 100,000 organizations worldwide. Instead
of integrating the globally-recognized ISO 14001 standard into its EP
regulations, the government effectively wrote its own detailed EMS
standard from scratch. The government’s proposed EMS model was
broadly similar to ISO 14001 and more or less compatible with leading
sectoral standards such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care
program.9 Yet it was full of idiosyncratic terminology, concepts and
requirements that would make it very difficult for a regulated organization,
auditor or government official to determine exactly how a “regulatory
EMS” would differ from an ISO 14001 EMS, or exactly what more was
needed to meet the requirements of the regulation. The result would have
been uncertainty and added cost for regulated firms, with uncertain public
policy benefits
Moreover, at no point in the preparation of the draft EP regulations did the
government consult with the established, multi-stakeholder national
committee responsible for negotiating international EMS standards and
adopting national EMS standards for Canada. It was only after the draft
regulations were released for public comment and the Canadian EMS
standards committee requested a meeting that the government consulted
relevant organs of the Canadian National Standards System.10
2006, EBR Registry No. RA06E0013, online: www.ebr.gov.on.ca, but were removed
when the final versions were released (copies on file with the authors).
9

The Responsible Care program was initiated by the Canadian chemical industry in 1985
and is now a global initiative of the International Council of Chemical Associations. See
the Responsible Care website at www.responsiblecare.org.
10

For a description of the Canadian National Standards System see Standards Council of
Canada, “National Standards System”, online: http://www.scc.ca/en/nss/.
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In the end the Ontario government heeded the concerns of the EMS
standards community. These concerns were focused on the problems
caused by a parallel, “home-grown” EMS specification.11The Ministry
incorporated most of the committee’s suggestions into the final EP
regulations, which were released in June, 2007.12 The government deleted
its “home-grown” EMS and simply referred to ISO 14001 and
Responsible Care as the applicable standards. This eliminated the risk of
uncertainty and added cost for regulated firms. But it also represented a
lost opportunity to engage in a serious public conversation about what ISO
14001 can contribute to the achievement of public policy goals, what
magnitude of regulatory incentive it should merit (for instance, is a 5%
penalty reduction appropriate?), and what additional or different steps
beyond conformity to ISO 14001, if any, should be expected from
regulated entities in exchange for more favourable regulatory treatment.
These questions have been raised in various jurisdictions around the world
since the first publication of ISO 14001 in 1996, and are long overdue for
serious and sustained public policy deliberation.
As a result, Ontario’s EPs regulations and the process by which they were
developed provide an object lesson in how not to approach the relationship
between standards and government regulation. The implications extend
well beyond the subject of EPs and EMSs to embrace broader questions
about:
•
•
•

what constitutes “smart” regulation,
what role standardization should play in smart regulation,
and
what role standards and smart regulation should play in
meeting the challenge of sustainable development.

11

The Canadian EMS committee did not express a view on other aspects of the draft
regulation that were of concern to individual members. Various companies, industry
groups, EMS auditors and environmental non-governmental organizations expressed their
views on these other issues separately.

12

O. Reg. 222/07 & 223/07, above n. 1.

2008]

HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS

7

We cannot answer these questions adequately without recognizing the
unique characteristics and challenges of small business. Small business is
the sleeping giant in the sustainability story, and it is about to awaken.
Government environmental regulation, for all its successes, has proven
inept at solving the environmental problems of and promoting
environmental sustainability in small business. Ontario’s EP regulations
are but one example of this problem. To be fair, the standardization
community in general and ISO in particular have done no better at
responding to the sustainability challenges of small business. This article
is a wake up call to both governments and standardization bodies to find
new ways to engage with small business, and quickly. Unfolding
environmental crises such as those associated with climate change, and
impending demographic shifts associated with the aging of the Baby
Boom generation, mean that Canada and other countries are about to enter
a period of turmoil that will truly test their understanding of and ability to
evolve toward sustainability.
Using Ontario’s EP regulations as a cautionary tale, this article presents
six tips for regulators on how to approach voluntary standards when
developing regulations.13 The tips are presented from the perspective of
two of the many people who have participated actively, on a volunteer
basis, in the development of ISO standards and their adoption as national
standards of Canada. The six tips are:

13

1.

Don’t re-invent the wheel. If recognized standards
development bodies have gone to the trouble of developing
a widely accepted, consensus-based standard that addresses
the subject matter of a proposed regulation, incorporate the
existing standard as far as possible and appropriate, instead
of drafting a new specification from scratch;

2.

Strive for consistency. If a widely accepted standard
already exists on the subject, don’t create a host of

While our tips are aimed specifically at the development of subordinate legislation
(such as regulations in Canada and administrative rules in the United States), they apply
generally to the development of public policy instruments by the executive or legislative
branches of government, from statutes to regulations, rules, orders, licences, and
guidelines.
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unexplained inconsistencies
regulation and the standard;

between
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the

proposed

3.

Make any extra requirements clear. If an existing
widely accepted standard does not, on its own, meet all the
public policy goals of the proposed regulation, identify
clearly how the standard is deficient and what more is
required to meet public policy objectives;

4.

Connect with the experts. Consult relevant standards
development committees when developing regulations;

5.

Get involved in voluntary standards development.
Participate in the work of relevant standards development
committees to keep abreast of relevant issues and influence
the content of standards on an ongoing basis; and

6.

Consider the needs of small business. Design regulations
in a way that addresses the special characteristics and
challenges of the small-to-medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) that represent around 98%14 of the business
community.

Before we turn to these tips, a brief introduction to environmental
penalties is in order.

II. ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES
Ontario borrowed the idea of environmental penalties from the United
States, where similar tools have been available since the 1970s, usually
under the name “administrative penalties” (APs). APs take two basic
forms. Some, known as expedited AP orders or field citations, are issued
on the spot by government enforcement personnel, like traffic tickets.
14

Industry Canada, “Key Small Business Statistics (KSBS)” (July 2007), online:
www.strategis.gc.ca/sbstatistics.
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These penalties impose small set fines for particular offences (usually in
the hundreds of dollars) and are subject to limited appeals and procedural
protections for violators.
The second form, known simply as
administrative or civil penalties, are not issued on the spot but assessed in
an environmental agency office on the basis of inspection reports and
other information. They are determined in accordance with often
complex, discretionary penalty assessment procedures based on a range of
factors including:
•
•
•
•

the gravity of the violation,
the violator’s state of mind,
the violator’s compliance history, and
the monetary or other benefits reaped by the violator as a
result of the violation.

They are typically much larger than on-the-spot fines (ranging from
thousands to tens of thousands of dollars) and involve considerably more
procedural steps and safeguards.

A. THE EMERGENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
Administrative penalties were introduced to allow government officials to
issue relatively modest financial penalties for relatively minor
environmental violations. This avoided the expense of a full-blown
prosecution. Previously in the US (and to a large extent still in other
jurisdictions including Canada), environmental law enforcement boiled
down more or less to a binary choice between voluntary industry
compliance and the blunt instrument of criminal or quasi-criminal
prosecution, with the latter reserved only for the most egregious cases.15
Investigations and prosecutions would often drag out for years before
reaching a final conclusion. As a result, many violations were not
investigated or prosecuted at all.16
15
16

E.g. David Boyd, Unnatural Law (Vancouver: UBC, 2003).

Dianne Saxe, “Environmental penalty discount for ISO 14001:2004 users” ISO
Management Systems (March-April 2007) 38.

10
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Several innovative enforcement tools, including APs, civil enforcement
actions, citizen suits and creative sentencing, were introduced to get away
from this often unsatisfactory binary choice. What sets APs apart is that
they do away with the need for formal court proceedings altogether. In
theory this may reduce enforcement costs for governments, regulated
firms and interested third parties alike, and increase the level of
enforcement of environmental laws.17
For these reasons many
governments have embraced APs enthusiastically.
Regulated industries, on the other hand, have generally recoiled from
them. They object to the spectre of absolute liability, the relative lack of
judicial scrutiny, the high level of administrative discretion over some
APs, and the one-size-fits-all approach of others. Some environmental
non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) have embraced APs, but others
have condemned them as trivializing what should properly be considered
crimes.18
These concerns notwithstanding, APs have proliferated in the US and have
since been introduced in several other countries. They are available under
all major US federal environmental statutes and in many states. They are
one of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s favourite enforcement
tools and their use has increased dramatically in the last few years. The
US EPA issued over 4,600 final APs in fiscal year 2006 with a total value
of US $42 million.19

17

Carolyn Abbot, “Environmental Command Regulation,” in Benjamin J. Richardson
and Stepan Wood, eds., Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 61 at
94.

18
19

Ibid. at 93.

US Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results:
FY
2006
Numbers
at
a
Glance
(November
15,
2006),
online:
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2006/fy2006numbers.pdf
(accessed 21 May 2007). These were the highest totals ever by far. Previously the
number had fluctuated between around 1000 and 2000 final APs per year. US
Environmental Protection Agency, “National Enforcement Trends – FY 2005,” online:
www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/nets.html (accessed 21 May 2007).
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES IN ONTARIO
Administrative penalties were first introduced in Ontario legislation in
1998. Faced with industry opposition, the government did not finalize the
implementing regulations and the legislation was never brought into force.
After a change of government and some high profile spills from
petrochemical facilities, a new provincial statute known as the “Spills
Bill” was enacted in 2005.20 Among other things, it reintroduced
administrative penalties under the name “environmental penalties” (EPs).
The government’s message to polluters was simple: “You spill, you
pay.”21 The stated purpose of the Spills Bill was to ensure that polluters
face immediate consequences for their actions. EPs would be assessed by
Ministry of the Environment (MOE) officials within a few days of a spill.
In theory, this “would encourage companies to make greater efforts to
prevent spills” and provide “additional incentives to clean them up
quickly”.22
The Spills Bill amended the province’s two flagship pollution statutes, the
Environmental Protection Act23 and Ontario Water Resources Act,24 to
authorize the imposition of EPs on “regulated persons”. The purpose of
EPs was to protect the environment by encouraging companies to take
steps, including implementation of an environmental management system
(EMS), to prevent environmental violations, remedy their effects and
prevent their recurrence.
The EPs provisions were to come into force only after implementing
regulations were finalized. The provincial government engaged in a yearlong process of public and stakeholder consultations on the EP regulations,
20

Environmental Enforcement Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 12 (Bill
133).

21

Government of Ontario, News Release, “McGuinty Government Introduces
Environmental
Penalties
Legislation”
(27
October
2004),
http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/2004/102702.htm (accessed 21 May 2007).

22
23
24

Ibid.
Above n. 8.
Ibid.

12
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starting in September, 2005 and culminating with the posting of the
proposed regulations and a detailed guidance document for a 98-day
public comment period in October, 2006.25
Under the draft regulations, only around 150 large facilities in nine
industry sectors26 that discharge contaminated effluent to a surface water
course or private effluent treatment plant would be subject to EPs. At
first, EPs would only be available for violations involving unlawful
discharges to water or land, with other violations such as permitting,
operating, sampling, reporting and record keeping contraventions to be
phased in after 18 months.
The draft regulations specified the procedures for initiating, calculating,
reviewing, settling, issuing, appealing and paying EPs. They set the
maximum amount of EPs at $100,000 per violation, per day, and specified
factors for determining the amount of an EP. EPs were not on-the-spot
fines, but were to be issued by the MOE only after notice to the violator.
The violator would have an opportunity to submit information and request
a review of the proposed EP. The amount of an EP would be determined
by an MOE Director based on the gravity of the violation and any
monetary benefit acquired by the violator as a result of the violation. The
amount could be reduced for a good compliance history, preventive
measures, prompt remedial action, membership in a provincial
environmental leadership program, or if the violator agreed to invest in a
“beyond compliance” project that delivered environmental or human
health benefits.
In addition, the “gravity component” of an EP would be reduced by 5%
for violators who could demonstrate that they had an EMS in place at the
time of the violation that met the detailed requirements set out in Schedule
1 of the regulations.27 The EMS would have to have been audited by an
25

Ontario Ministry of the Environment, “Consultation Process: Environmental Penalties”
(slide presentation, November, 2006; copy on file with authors).

26

Electric power generation, industrial minerals, inorganic chemicals, iron and steel
manufacturing, metal casting, metal mining, organic chemical manufacturing, petroleum
and pulp and paper. Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, s. 2(1) and Table 1.
27

Ibid., s. 17 and Schedule 1.
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independent, external auditor and the violator would have to submit a
statement from the auditor certifying that the EMS satisfied the
requirements of the regulations. In effect, this called for a compliance
audit, not an audit of an EMS, let alone an ISO 14001 audit. Industry and
auditors objected that the cost of the required audit would exceed the
benefit of the 5% reduction.
Aside from this 5% reduction, procedures implemented or actions taken as
part of an EMS (for example, environmental policies and procedures, risk
analysis, preventive maintenance, containment structures, monitoring
systems, operational controls, employee training, and emergency
preparedness and response systems) could also be taken into account when
determining what actions the violator took to prevent or mitigate the
violation, further reducing the gravity component of the EP.
The size of the penalty reduction for an EMS might seem so modest as not
to merit any serious attention. Why all the fuss about such a minor
incentive? On one level this is a fair point. The amount of the penalty
reduction is insufficient to provide any genuine incentive for regulated
facilities to implement an EMS in line with the regulations. Furthermore,
the penalty reduction was relatively small potatoes in the public debate
about the EPs scheme. It was dwarfed by industry concerns about double
jeopardy and absolute liability.
On another level, however, the EMS penalty reduction raises issues that
far exceed its modest size.

C. ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES AND SMART REGULATION
The introduction of APs or EPs is widely seen as part of a move toward
“smarter” or more “responsive” regulation. “Smart regulation” is
presented by its proponents as an alternative to both the inherently limited
“command and control” model of first-generation environmental
regulation and the perceived excesses of neo-conservative deregulation.28

28

E.g. Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1998); Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending

14
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The “command and control” model of environmental regulation was first
introduced to respond to the plethora of environmental problems brought
on by industrial pollution.29 This model of regulation was highly
intrusive, prescriptive and inflexible, typically prohibiting any polluting
activity without a permit. It commanded in detail when and to what extent
industry should clean up, often to the point of prescribing the precise
technologies to be used. It controlled the observance of these prescriptions
through monitoring, inspection and criminal or quasi-criminal
enforcement. It is widely credited with having achieved substantial
improvements of a variety of “first generation” environmental problems.
But by the early 1980s it had come under increasing criticism for being too
cumbersome, costly, rigid and slow in producing further improvements.
There were warnings that it was nearing the limits of its technical
capacity30 or liable to “break down under its own weight.”31 These
critiques had early political victories in the neo-conservative programs of
deregulation and fiscal restraint of the Reagan-Thatcher years. By the
mid-1990s, however, inspired by the Rio Earth Summit and an
unprecedented wave of public environmental awareness, many
governments and regulation scholars began to take more nuanced
approaches to the problem, seeking to reinvent environmental regulation
in ways that built on its early successes and at the same time recognized its
limitations and the changing nature of environmental problems.
One of the principal limitations of traditional environmental regulation is
that it was and remains aimed overwhelmingly at large, stationary, pointsource polluters – that is, big companies and government facilities (for
the Deregulation-Reregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1992); Cass Sunstein,
“Paradoxes of the Regulatory State” (1990) 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407.
29

For overviews of the command model of environmental regulation and its critics, see
Lynn Johannson, “Tuning into Station WIIFY on ISO 14000: What’s in it for you” Total
Quality Environmental Management (Winter 1995/96) __; Ben Richardson and Stepan
Wood, “Environmental Law for Sustainability,” in Ben Richardson and Stepan Wood,
eds., Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart, 2006) 1, 3-13; Carolyn Abbot,
“Command Environmental Regulation,” in ibid., 61.

30
31

Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair, above n. 28.

Eric W. Orts, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Northwestern U. L. Rev.
1227, 1241.
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example, sewage works and power plants). By contrast, many of the most
pressing contemporary environmental challenges – habitat destruction,
biodiversity loss, climate change and persistent toxic substances, to name
some of the most prominent – are of a different, potentially more
intractable, character because they are the cumulative results of the
everyday choices and actions of countless people and organizations that
control innumerable geographically dispersed, often mobile, non-point
sources of pollution. To address these problems, we must mobilize and
influence a much broader range of actors, including individuals,
households and – crucially, as we will argue toward the end of the article –
small business.
The paradigmatic tools of command regulation have limited capacity to
respond to these contemporary challenges and to regulate these kinds of
actors effectively. A traditional command-regulation approach to these
problems and actors would entail a prohibitively costly, technically
impractical and politically unacceptable level of government intrusion into
the minutiae of everyday life. It is questionable whether such an approach
would yield a net gain for the environment
We use “smart regulation” as an umbrella term for efforts to take a more
nuanced and sophisticated approach to environmental and other problems.
It aims to make more effective and efficient use of public resources. It
employs a greater variety of regulatory instruments, from taxes and
emissions trading to corporate environmental disclosure and public
participation rights. It seeks to stimulate self-reflection and self-correction
by regulated actors in line with public goals, rather than dictating the
details of permissible behaviour. Such an approach “attempts to create
incentives and procedures that induce entities to act in certain ways and to
engage in internal reflection about what form that behaviour should
take…the state sets goals, but shares more of the responsibility for
achieving them with regulated entities.”32

32

D.J. Fiorino, “Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and
Governance” (1999) 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441, 448.
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Smart regulation has been embraced, in various forms, by governments
and intergovernmental organizations throughout the developed world.33 In
Canada, its most recent manifestation was the previous federal
government’s Smart Regulation initiative, launched in 2005 and led by the
Treasury Board. The stated goal of the Smart Regulation initiative was to
create better, not less, regulation.34 The initiative was continued under a
different name, but with substantially the same emphasis, by the current
federal government elected in January, 2006.35 It involves a restructuring
of the process of assessing, reforming and improving the regime in which
regulations are developed, managed, enforced and measured. It calls for:
•
•
•

•

increased scrutiny of the costs and benefits of new and existing
regulations;
increased cooperation and harmonization among federal,
provincial, and territorial governments, including more consistent
environmental assessment procedures;
quicker approval processes for drugs, medical devices, and
pesticides; increased international regulatory cooperation,
including, most importantly, greater harmonization of regulatory
standards and product approvals with the United States;
greater understanding and support for the needs of large industry;
and

33

Much of the impetus for this spread came from the Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development (OECD) and its multi-year Regulatory Reform agenda. E.g.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Regulatory Policies in
OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 2002); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Trade and Regulatory Reform: Insights from Country Experience (Paris:
OECD, 2001).

34

The word “smart” was an acronym for “Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic,
and Timely,” although the government did not necessarily commit to achieve these
specific objectives. Reg Alcock, President of the Treasury Board of Canada,
“Government of Canada’s Implementation Plan for Smart Regulation,” speech delivered
to National Press Club (Ottawa, 24 March 2005), online: www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/psdp/2005/0324_e.asp?printable=True.
35

The current Conservative government calls it “performance-based regulation” and
dropped the adjective “smart,” presumably to distance itself from the previous Liberal
government.
See Government of Canada, “Regulation” web site, online:
www.regulation.gc.ca.
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less burdensome regulation of small business.36

The Smart Regulation initiative has been criticized by leading Canadian
environmental groups, who argue that it:
•
•
•
•
•

is a deregulatory agenda in disguise,
prioritizes business over public health, safety, and the
environment,
neglects the need to apply and enforce existing environmental
regulations,
ignores evidence that command regulation can be more effective
than voluntary or non-regulatory approaches, and
ignores evidence that international harmonization tends to exert
downward pressure on environmental, health, and safety standards
and to hamper transparency, accountability, timeliness and
effectiveness of regulation.37

Whatever the merits of these objections, they are a useful reminder that
smart regulation is not just about greater flexibility, competitiveness and
lower regulatory costs for regulated businesses. It must balance these
attributes with the imperative to protect public health, safety, welfare, and
environmental integrity and promote environmentally and socially
sustainable economic development. It is also a reminder that strong and
effective laws and regulations can and should maintain a prominent place
in a sophisticated mix of policy instruments.
Smart regulation, in theory, means using the best tool for the problem at
hand, employing the best technique for every situation. Among other
36

External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, Smart Regulation: A Regulatory
Strategy for Canada (Ottawa: External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, 2004).

37

Canadian Environmental Law Association, Letter to Prime Minister Paul Martin (22
October 2004), online: www.cela.ca (accessed March 12, 2005); Canadian Environmental
Law Association (CELA) et al., Letter to Chair and members of the External Advisory
Committee on Smart Regulation (16 August 2004), online: www.cela.ca (accessed
March 12, 2005); and West Coast Environmental Law Association, West Coast
Environmental Law’s Comments on ‘Smart Regulation for Canada,’ Submission to
External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation (August 2004), online: www.pcobcp.gc.ca/smartreg-regint/en/06/01/index.html (visited 12 March 2005).
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things, the federal government directive on Smart Regulation challenges
government decision-makers to “make use of all or parts of relevant
national or international standards, guidelines, and recommendations as a
basis for technical regulations and for conformity assessment procedures
when they fulfill intended policy objectives.”38 This brings us to the
central question of this article: what role can voluntary non-governmental
standards play in smart regulation and in moving society on the path
toward sustainability? We answer this question in the form of six tips for
regulators.

III. SIX TIPS FOR INTEGRATING STANDARDS INTO
SMART REGULATION
In the remainder of the article we present six tips for how to integrate nongovernmental consensus standards into government regulation. In each
case, we use the example of the draft Ontario EP regulations as an object
lesson.
Tip 1. Don’t re-invent the wheel. If recognized standards development
bodies have gone to the trouble of developing a widely accepted,
consensus-based standard that addresses the subject matter of a
proposed regulation, incorporate the existing standard as far as
possible and appropriate, instead of drafting a new specification
from scratch.
When the government of Ontario decided to develop regulations offering a
penalty reduction to violators with an EMS in place, it had a choice. It
could adopt ISO 14001 or another existing standard as a benchmark
against which their management systems would be judged. Or, it could
develop its own EMS requirements from scratch. ISO 14001 is the
product of many thousands of hours of deliberation by hundreds of experts
over more than a decade. It was drafted by experts from industry,
38

Government of Canada, Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (Ottawa:
Government of Canada, 2007) 6, online: www.regulation.gc.ca. This directive replaced
the previous Liberal government’s Cabinet directive on smart regulation, which contained
an identical provision.
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environmental consulting firms, standards development organizations,
government, consumer groups and – to a lesser extent – environmental
groups and research institutions, representing dozens of countries and
international organizations. These experts, working mostly as volunteers,
developed ISO 14001 over an initial five year period and saw it through a
further five-year revision process that culminated with the publication of
the second edition in 2004. Most of them participated through their
national ISO member bodies. Some participated through the numerous
international governmental and non-governmental organizations that have
liaison status with ISO. The process involved a significant investment of
resources. It work followed the consensus-based standards development
model of ISO and its member bodies. In this model, in theory at least, all
major interests, from big and small business to auditors, governments,
consumers, public interest groups and scientists, are represented
effectively. In theory, the resulting standards reflect a consensus of all
these interests. While this ideal may not be realized perfectly in practice,39
ISO 14001 represents the closest approximation we have to a global
consensus on what an environmental management system should look
like.
Instead of reaping the fruits of this collective experience and expertise, the
government of Ontario expended substantial time and energy drafting its
own detailed description of the requirements an EMS must meet to qualify
for the reduction. These requirements did not refer to ISO 14001 or any
other standard such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care
program.40 Instead it set out detailed requirements for:
□ an environmental policy,
□ identification of environmental aspects
requirements,
□ environmental objectives and targets,
□ roles and responsibilities,
□ resources,
39

and

legal

Some environmental NGOs, for example, withdrew from or refused to participate in
the development of ISO 14001 in the mid-1990s because of perceived industry
domination.

40

Draft EP regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1.
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operational control,
monitoring,
emergency preparedness and response,
corrective and preventive action,
training and competence,
documentation,
audits and management review.

These are all typical elements of an EMS.
The government may have had cogent reasons for promulgating its own
purpose-built EMS standard. For one thing, it commissioned research
which revealed that many companies’ EMSs were custom-made or based
on a particular industry code such as Responsible Care. The government
wished, quite reasonably, to accommodate the diversity of approaches to
EMSs. Another reason may have been the government’s concern that an
ISO 14001-based EMS, on its own, would not respond adequately to
public policy objectives such as improved spill prevention, corrective
action, legal compliance, and corporate transparency.

A. ADVANTAGES OF INCORPORATING STANDARDS INTO
REGULATION
Given this line of reasoning, why should regulatory authorities incorporate
existing non-governmental standards into regulatory instruments? Why,
for example, should the Ontario government adopt ISO 14001 as the
baseline for eligibility for an EP reduction? The Standards Council of
Canada (SCC) answers this question as follows:
Some advantages for a regulatory authority referencing standards
developed within the National Standards System include:
(a)

the standards have been developed by balanced committees
of all relevant interests, employing the principles of
consensus;
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the standards have undergone a public review process as well
as a “second level review” by the SDO [standards
development organization] prior to publication;
the standards are maintained and reviewed at appropriate
intervals to ensure current technological developments are
incorporated;
the commercial needs of producers, users, and other interests
are addressed at the development stage, thus ensuing
regulations referencing these standards are more amenable to
commercial acceptance; and,
the standards address the national public interest by
considering to the extent possible as appropriate to the
subject of the standard, how it advances the national
economy, supports sustainable development, benefits the
health, safety and welfare of workers and the public, assists
and protects consumers and facilitates trade.41

B. WHAT ARE STANDARDS?
What, then, are standards and what is the Standards Council of Canada?
For purposes of this article, a standard is a “document, established by
consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common
and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or
results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a
given context.”42 Standards may relate to nomenclature, measurement,
design, function, performance, safety, consistency, ingredients or any
number of other attributes of materials, products or the processes by which
they are produced. They may relate to inter-operability or compatibility of
different products. They may also, as in the case of EMS standards, relate
41

Standards Council of Canada, Key Considerations in the Development and Use of
Standards in Legislative Instruments (Ottawa: Standards Council of Canada, 2006) 3,
online: http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/brochures/index.shtml.
42

Standards Council of Canada, CAN-P-1E, Accreditation of Standards Development
Organizations
(Ottawa:
SCC,
2006)
s.
2.2
(“CAN-P-1E”),
online:
http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/criteria/all.shtml, quoting ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004,
Standardization and Related Activities – General Vocabulary (Geneva: ISO/IEC, 2004) s.
3.2 (“ISO/IEC Guide 2”).
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to a generic management framework and associated processes employed
by organizations.
Standardization is as old as human history.43 The case for standardization
is simple. Clear, verifiable standards facilitate trade by encouraging
consistency and interchangeability of products and parts from different
places. They protect customers by discouraging fraud. They can enhance
the reliability and safety of goods and services. In theory, they can
facilitate the transfer of technology from advanced to developing and
transitional economies and promote transnational cooperation on
economic and scientific matters. For proponents of standardization, the
value of standards in enhancing productivity and prosperity cannot be
understated.44 According to critics, however, standards may inhibit
innovation by fixing technologies or practices in time. They may also
operate as barriers to market entry, a complaint often raised by developing
country producers who see standards as non-tariff trade barriers. Despite
these potential objections, standards are widely seen by governments and
business as enhancing social welfare and economic prosperity.45
Virtually no aspect of our daily lives is untouched by standards. Many
people are unaware how deeply their lives are affected by standardization.
Standards govern everything from screw thread sizes and bicycle helmet
design to internet protocols and high definition television formats. In
Canada alone there are several thousand national standards “for everything
from AC circuits to zirconium”.46 At the international level there are
many thousands more. ISO has published almost 16,500 international

43

John Perry, The Story of Standards (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1955).

44

Danielle Goldfarb, If We Can Fix It Here, We Can Make It Anywhere: Effective
Policies at Home to Boost Canada’s Global Success (Ottawa: Conference Board of
Canada, 2007).

45

E.g. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the Links
between Trade, Standards and the WTO (Geneva: WTO, 2006) at 29, 41.

46

Standards Council of
http://www.scc.ca/en/nss/.

Canada,

“National

Standards

System”,

online:
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standards.47 You can thank international standards for the fact that a bank
card issued by a Canadian bank works in a bank machine in Brazil, or that
you can fix a lawnmower made in the United States with a bolt made in
China. For all their pervasiveness, however, standards and the bodies that
develop them keep a remarkably low profile. You may have heard of ISO
photographic film speed ratings (if you are old enough to remember film
cameras, that is). You may have seen the Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
logo on consumer products. You may even have been momentarily
curious when passing a highway billboard declaring a facility to be
registered to ISO 9001 or ISO 14001.48 But this is the extent of most
people’s knowledge of standards.
Standards, as defined in this article, have two key characteristics that
distinguish them from legislative instruments such as statutes and
regulations. First, they are approved by a recognized body, which means a
body recognized by the relevant national or international body responsible
for accrediting standards development organizations. Second, they are
established by consensus, which carries two conditions: first, that
representatives of all interest categories participate in their development;
and second, that there is no sustained opposition from any significant
segment of interested parties at any critical stage in the development of a
standard.

C. APPROVED BY A RECOGNIZED BODY
Although there may occasionally be a question whether a particular body
is or should be a “recognized body,” the central players are
uncontroversial. ISO sits at the pinnacle of the standardization world and
is recognized, alongside a handful of other international standards

47

International Organization for Standardization, ISO In Figures for the Year 2006
(Geneva:
ISO,
2007),
online:
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isoinfigures/January2007-p1.html.

48

Registration is only one option for demonstrating conformity to these two voluntary
standards. We discuss the other options below.
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bodies,49 as a leading source of technical standards. ISO has been
recognized as such by the World Trade Organization’s Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) Committee and numerous United Nations organs. There is
no controversy that it is a “recognized body” for purposes of our
definition. It is a network of 158 national member bodies, one member
per country, coordinated by a Central Secretariat in Switzerland.50
ISO occupies a peculiar niche, perched between the public and private
sectors. It acts as a bridging organization, striving for consensus on
standards that meet both the needs of society, as articulated by
governments, and the requirements of business. ISO membership is open
to the one body in each country that is the most representative of
standardization in its country. Many ISO member bodies, especially in
developing and transitional countries, are government agencies or quasipublic bodies with their mandates set out by legislation. Other ISO
member bodies in some industrialized countries have their roots in the
private sector, representing national partnerships of industry associations.
Canada’s ISO member body is the Standards Council of Canada, a federal
crown corporation created by statute in 1970. Its mandate is to foster and
promote voluntary standardization in Canada. Although it reports to
Parliament and is financed partially by Parliamentary appropriation, it is
independent of government in its policies and operations. The SCC is
governed by a Governing Council of 15 members appointed to represent
federal, provincial and territorial governments, accredited Canadian
standards development organizations (SDOs) and the private sector.
The SCC oversees Canada’s National Standards System (NSS) and
coordinates Canadian input to foreign and international standardization
forums, including ISO. The NSS is a network of more than 400
organizations and more than fifteen thousand individuals involved in
standards development, promotion and implementation in Canada. The
SCC does not develop standards itself. It has accredited four SDOs to
49

Chief among which are the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC), the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission
(Codex).

50

ISO In Figures for the Year 2006, supra note 47.
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develop National Standards of Canada.
The Canadian Standards
Association (CSA) is one of these. 51 We will focus on CSA since it is
responsible for developing Canadian EMS standards. CSA is an
independent, not-for-profit membership-based association serving
business, industry, government and consumers. Its primary mandate is to
develop standards that work for people and business.52
When CSA or another accredited SDO develops a standard, it submits it to
SCC for approval as a National Standard of Canada. Similarly, when an
international standards body such as ISO develops a standard with
Canadian participation or potential application in Canada, the standard
may be submitted to SCC by the relevant Canadian SDO for approval as a
National Standard of Canada. A standard may be designated as a National
Standard of Canada if it meets the following criteria:
•
•
•
•
•

it was developed by a committee that had balanced
representation of all stakeholders including consumer and
public interests and followed a consensus process,
the standard was subjected to public review,
it is published in both official languages,
it is consistent with existing international standards and
it does not constitute an illegitimate barrier to trade.53

D. DEVELOPED BY CONSENSUS
The principle of consensus is the core of the standards community’s claim
to credibility. It is the key reason regulators should refer to standards when
developing regulatory instruments. SCC adopts ISO’s definition of
consensus as “general agreement, characterized by the absence of
sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the
51

The others are the Bureau de Normalisation du Québec (BNQ), Canadian General
Standards Board (CGSB), and Underwriters Laboratories of Canada (ULC).

52
53

See CSA home page, http://www.csa.ca.

Standards Council of Canada, CAN-P-2F, Requirements and Procedures for the
Request for, Development, Approval, Preparation, and Maintenance of National
Standards
of
Canada
(Ottawa:
SCC,
2006)
(“CAN-P-2F”),
online:
http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/criteria/all.shtml.
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concerned interests and by a process seeking to take into account the
views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting
arguments.”54 Elaborating upon this basic definition, SCC’s rules – which
are contained in basic documents known as “CAN-Ps” – require that the
consensus process be governed by the following principles:
a) Equal access and effective participation by concerned interests
(this entails sufficient resources, equal access to information, and
understanding of the process by all parties). In order to ensure
effective participation, resources (money, training, staff expertise,
etc.) shall be identified for member participation;
b) Respect for diverse interests and identification of those who
should be provided access … to provide the needed balance of
interests;
c) Mechanism for dispute resolution….55
SCC recognizes the “particular challenges in finding the resources to
permit participation by Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), academics,
and consumers.”56
SCC and CSA host or support the work of thousands of volunteers from
all segments of Canadian society who serve on hundreds of different
standards development committees. The principle of consensus is
manifested in both the structure of these committees and their decisionmaking processes. SCC and CSA rules require that the membership of
standards development committees reflect a "balanced matrix" of
interested and affected parties. This is to ensure that the committee can
capitalize on the combined strengths and expertise of all interest groups
and no single category of interest can dominate the process.57 The SCC
and CSA recognize four basic interest categories:

54

CAN-P-1E, above note 42, s. 2.1, quoting ISO/IEC Guide 2, above note 42, s. 1.7.

55

CAN-P-1E, ibid., s. 1.1.

56

Ibid.

57

CAN-P-2F, above note 53, s. 3.1.5.
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Producers (those predominantly involved in production of
products, materials or services, which usually means business
firms);
Users (those who predominantly represent end users of the
subject products, materials or services, including consumers);
Regulators (government bodies involved in regulating the
subject products, materials or services); and
General interest (those with a demonstrated interest who do not
fall into the other categories, such as academics, scientists and
public interest NGOs).58

Other interest categories may be identified that are relevant to particular
committees’ work. In the area of environmental management, for
example, “service/professional” is recognized as a separate interest
category to reflect the role of professional consultants, auditors and
registrars59 in this area.
Each CSA standards development committee must have a membership
matrix that is approved by a strategic steering committee responsible for
overseeing its work.60 The matrix defines interest categories appropriate
to the committee’s scope and stipulates the minimum and maximum
numbers of voting members for each interest category. The actual number
of voting members in any one category may not exceed the sum of the
actual number of voting members in the two smallest interest categories.
This requirement must be maintained as individual members change.
Further, it must be met whenever any letter ballot or recorded vote is
taken. If the committee is out of balance, a vote will not be taken until
balance is restored. Once a draft standard has been agreed upon in
committee, it is submitted for public review and amended if necessary to
reflect the comments received. Finally, standards are living documents,
revised and refreshed to address changing requirements and emerging
58

Ibid.; Canadian Standards Association, CSA Directives and Guidelines Governing
Standardization, Part 1: Participants and Organizational Structure (Rexdale, ON: CSA,
1999) s. 3.3.3 (“CSA Directives”).

59

It should be noted that registrars do not vote in Canadian standards development
committees, as this might represent a conflict of interest.

60

CSA Directives, above n. 58, s. 3.3.
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technologies. Each standard is reviewed every five years in a process of
continual improvement. If the review concludes that a revision is required,
this triggers a process of negotiations to improve the standard.
The principles of balanced representation and consensus decision-making
are, not surprisingly, realized imperfectly in practice. The CSA has been
criticized for inadequate participation by consumer groups, public interest
NGOs and SMEs.61 There are various obstacles to effective participation
by these interest categories, not the least of which are competing priorities
and lack of awareness, resources, time, or technical capacity. This makes
it difficult to maintain a balanced matrix in some cases. In other cases,
there may be more difficulty attracting adequate participation from
government or industry. In any event the principle of equal and effective
participation by all interest categories is taken seriously by both CSA and
SCC. Furthermore, it is not clear that typical governmental policy-making
processes do a substantially better job than CSA or SCC at ensuring
balanced and effective participation by all interested and affected parties.
As a result, the Canadian “balanced matrix” approach to national standards
development is frequently held up as an example for other ISO member
bodies to follow.

E. MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARDS
ISO 14001 is a management system standard. Unlike traditional technical
standards that address the characteristics, performance or design of
specific products, management system standards address the broader
management structures and processes employed in organizations. They
are “generic” in that they are not specific to any particular product,
material, process, or industry sector but may be applied by any
organization of any size or type, regardless of location and regardless of
whether it is in the private or public sector.

61

See, e.g., Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, CSA Environmental
Standards Writing: Barriers to Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
Involvement (Toronto: CIELAP, 1997); Pollution Probe, Environmental NonGovernmental Organization (ENGO) Participation in National Standards Setting
(Toronto: Pollution Probe, 2002).

2008]

HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS

29

Management system standards were first developed in the field of quality
management. The best known are the ISO 9000 family of quality
management standards. More than 900,000 certifications exist in 170
countries and economies to the ISO 9001 quality management system
standard.62 As with ISO 14001, this number does not reflect the number
of firms with ISO 9001 certificates, because one company may hold more
than one certificate. The exact number of companies involved is not
known. The management system approach has spread to other fields such
as food safety, corporate social responsibility, information security and
occupational health and safety.
It also spread, famously, to environmental management. There are more
than twenty standards in the ISO 14000 family. With the exception of ISO
14001, they are all guidance standards, developed to help the user better
understand the opportunities available regarding various aspects of
environmental management. At the heart of this family is ISO 14001, the
standard on environmental management systems. It is the only standard in
the family that sets out “specifications” – that is, auditable requirements.
ISO 14001 outlines requirements that standards developers from around
the world have agreed are important to “enable an organization to develop
and implement a policy and objectives which take into account legal
requirements and information about significant environmental aspects.”63
ISO 14001, like other generic management standards, is designed to help
any organization improve how it manages the environmental impacts of its
activities, products or services. The organization may be a for-profit
private sector enterprise, a not-for profit organization or a public sector
entity. ISO 14001, like ISO 9001, is a voluntary standard. Organizations
may adopt it in part or in whole. Only organizations that adopt all its
requirements may claim conformity to the standard, but many
organizations may realize benefits from implementing only certain parts of
it. An organization may, for instance, already have a management system
of its own design in place and wish to improve just one or a few elements.
Furthermore, ISO 14001 is a “what” document. It outlines the
requirements of a well-functioning EMS, but it does not dictate how these
62

ISO Survey, above n. 4.

63

ISO 14001: 2004, above n. 3, Introduction.
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requirements are to be fulfilled. The how is the responsibility of the
adopting organization. This allows ISO 14001 to accommodate the
diversity of organizations, cultures, and economic regions.
Considering this diversity, it is amazing that agreement on an international
EMS standard was achieved at all. Recall that standards are developed via
a consensus process, so there has to be substantial agreement without
sustained opposition from any significant portion of the interested parties
at the table for a standard to be voted and accepted as an ISO document.
Consensus has to be achieved not just at the international level but also in
each ISO member body, where national negotiating positions are worked
out and decisions ultimately made whether to adopt an ISO standard
nationally.
ISO 14001 was developed by an ISO committee known as ISO/TC 207/SC
1. Canadian experts played important roles in the negotiation of the
original standard and its recent revision. Throughout this process,
Canada’s position in the international negotiations was developed by a
national “mirror committee,” the Standards Council of Canada’s Canadian
Advisory Committee on ISO/TC 207/SC 1 (the “CAC/SC 1” for short).
This mirror committee is harmonized with (i.e., identical to) the CSA
technical committee responsible for developing national EMS standards,
the CSA Technical Committee on EMS (the “TC/EMS” for short).64 As
such, the committee members wear two hats. When deliberating Canadian
positions in the international standards development process, they act as
the CAC/SC 1. When considering whether to adopt a final ISO standard
as a National Standard of Canada or other issues affecting domestic EMS
standardization, they act as the TC/EMS. Either way, the committee is
bound by the balanced matrix and consensus requirements described
above. This multi-stakeholder Canadian EMS standards committee
deliberated at great length the merits of ISO 14001 for use in Canada.
The existence of ISO 14001 is a testament to a global recognition of the
challenge of sound environmental management and the benefits of a
64

CSA environmental committee names and structures were changed in 2007, but the
basic model of a combined national and international “mirror” committee on EMS was
maintained. The combined TC/EMS—CAC/SC 1 is now a subcommittee of a larger
CSA Technical Committee on Environmental Management and Related Activities.
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common framework upon which common elements can be addressed in a
way that enables comparison across different organizational, social and
economic contexts. A key advantage of voluntary management system
standards is that they enable an “apples to apples” comparison, while
accommodating regional variability and the unique characteristics of
individual organizational cultures. Just as there are over 10,000 different
varieties of apples, there is massive variety among private, public and
voluntary sector organizations. The flexibility of ISO 14001 is important
as there are over 150 million legally constituted enterprises in the world.
Over 95% of these are SMEs.65 When properly integrated, the
management system for each one would reflect something of its unique
business culture, even though there would be similarities within a sector or
business type. That is both the beauty and the bane of EMS standards.

F. INCORPORATING EMS STANDARDS INTO SMART REGULATION
When drafting its EPs regulations, the Ontario government could have
incorporated ISO 14001 as a baseline for the EMS component of the
regulations. It did not. ISO 14001 was not even mentioned in the draft
regulations. Instead the government drafted its own ad hoc, six-page66
EMS standard more or less from scratch, along with a fifty-page guidance
document which included a table listing some differences between its
regulatory EMS and ISO 14001. With the stroke of a pen, more than a
decade of complex international negotiations, delicate compromises and
multi-stakeholder national deliberations over ISO 14001 were set aside, at
least for purposes of the EPs regime.
This was not an example of Smart Regulation, for several reasons. First,
by attempting, in effect, to write a whole new EMS standard, the
government passed up an opportunity to save some public policy
development costs by taking advantage of the substantial expertise, time
65

We estimated this figure by extrapolation from data compiled by the International
Finance Corporation. International Finance Corporation, Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises: A Collection of Published Data (Washington: IFC, 2006).

66

For comparison, this is approximately the same length as the requirements clause of
ISO 14001. ISO 14001:2004, above note 3, clause 4.
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and money that went into the development of the existing ISO 14001
standard. This would have been an effective way to move a portion of the
cost of policy development off the public budget and enlist nongovernmental resources in the development of public policy instruments.67
Second, even more important than saving governmental resources, one of
the central goals of smart regulation is to enlist the self-critical, reflexive
capacities of regulated actors so that they govern themselves in line with
democratically established public policy goals. EMSs are quintessentially
a reflexive tool.68 If designed properly and implemented in a robust and
credible manner, they stimulate organizations to reflect upon and
systematically manage their environmental aspects and impacts. This
fosters a cyclical process of target-setting, implementation, self-evaluation
and high level management review that prompts continual improvement of
both their management systems and their environmental performance.
EMSs allow organizations to internalize environmental issues, including
environmental legal requirements, into all decision-making, from high
level strategy to daily operations.
Third, and crucially, regulations encouraging voluntary EMS adoption
preserve a high level of autonomy for regulated entities. We live in
liberal-democratic capitalist societies, in which individual autonomy and
private enterprise are fundamental values. Autonomy in an enterprise is a
valued condition; that is one reason it is called “private” enterprise.
Business owners wish to maintain their autonomy so that they are able to
respond quickly, efficiently and profitably to market needs.
Encouragement of autonomy also makes sense from a regulator’s
perspective, within certain limits. Although there are exceptions, the most
effective forms of regulation are often those that induce regulated entities
to exercise their autonomy in a direction that achieves regulators’ public
policy goals, rather than intervening in the minutiae of regulated firms’
operations. This might be considered the Holy Grail of contemporary
regulation in liberal-capitalist societies: to design a regulatory regime that
effectively enlists the autonomous self-regulatory capacities of regulated
67

See Peter N. Grabosky, “Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory
Compliance” (1995) 8 Governance 527.

68

Orts, supra note 31.
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actors in the service of democratically determined public policy goals.69
Simply put, the more an organization does on its own and the more
efficiently and effectively it operates, the less burden there is on law
enforcement and the public purse. This is true whether it is a private or
public sector organization.
Governments that promote policies
encouraging the adoption of EMSs can expect to benefit from more
independent action that may conceivably place many organizations ahead
of regulatory requirements, provided the EMSs are sufficiently robust.
Regulations that encourage the adoption of credible and robust EMSs can,
therefore, exploit the autonomous, reflexive capacities of regulated
organizations in the service of collective goals.
Incorporating an existing National Standard of Canada into the EP
regulations rather than rewriting it from scratch would also have had other
advantages, including:
•

•
•
•
•

Presenting a regulatory solution that was likely to meet the
expectations of a majority of the stakeholders addressed by the
regulation, since the standard was developed by a consensus of
various interests;
Embodying the knowledge and experience of a wider range of
experts than the government might normally have at its disposal;
Enhancing uniformity of requirements faced by regulated entities,
thereby reducing regulated entities’ costs and eliminating barriers
to movement of goods and services;
Enhancing the likelihood of voluntary, market-driven compliance
with regulations, thereby reducing the burden of regulatory
oversight; and
Enhancing social efficiency, insofar as regulated entities use the
same tool to meet both market and regulatory needs.70

69

E.g. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of
Government” (1992) 43 British. J. Sociology 173, 184; Grabosky, above note 67;
Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair, above n. 28, 10, 123-125; Nikolas Rose, Powers of
Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 1999) 50.

70

Standards Council of Canada, above note 41, 6.
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In light of these advantages it is not surprising that governments
incorporate non-governmental technical standards into regulation very
frequently and have done so as long as anyone can remember, especially
in the fields of health, safety and consumer protection.71 Hundreds of
voluntary standards have been incorporated by reference into current
Canadian federal, provincial and municipal laws.72 The same is true in
many other jurisdictions, including the European Community.73
There are many ways to incorporate non-governmental standards into
government regulation. For example:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

conformity with a voluntary standard might be made
mandatory for particular organizations, products, materials,
equipment, or processes,
it might be made a default basis for issuing a government
approval,
it might be a consideration or requirement for government
procurement contracts,
it might be the basis for eligibility for subsidies, reduced
penalties or relief from otherwise applicable regulatory
requirements (as in the case of the Ontario EP regulations)
Regulators or courts might be authorized to order violators
to implement a voluntary standard,
a voluntary standard might be identified as “good practice”
for regulatory purposes,
nonconformity with a voluntary standard might trigger
documentation, reporting or remediation duties,
use of a voluntary standard might be authorized for testing,
inspecting or measuring a regulated entity’s operations,
equipment, or products, or

71

E.g. Robert W. Hamilton, “The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the
Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health” (1978) 56
Texas L. Rev. 1329.

72

Saxe, above note 16.

73

E.g. EMAS Regulation, above note 5.

2008]

HOW NOT TO INCORPORATE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS

•

35

a voluntary standard’s definition of a term might be
adopted as the regulatory definition.74

Standards can be incorporated in whole or in part, and with or without
qualifications.75
Standards are usually incorporated into regulation by reference – that is,
the standard is referred to rather than reproduced in the regulation.
Occasionally, governments reproduce standards or parts of standards
verbatim in regulations. This is true of the EMAS regulation, which
reproduces Clause 4 of ISO 14001 verbatim (with ISO’s permission) as
the EMS component of the scheme. The main disadvantage of this
approach is the danger that inconsistency will develop between the
regulation and the standard over time. Standards are typically revised from
time to time, necessitating amendment of the corresponding regulation and
posing the risk of inconsistency if there is a lag between publication of the
revised standard and amendment of the regulation.76 Incorporation by
reference, by contrast, allows regulators to accommodate subsequent
changes to a standard without the necessity of further regulation. This
allows regulation to respond easily and quickly to technical changes. The
trade-off is reduced control over the content of regulation, which may be
undesirable from the regulator’s perspective. In some cases it may even
constitute an impermissible delegation of authority.77 As a result
74

For a taxonomy of ways in which voluntary standards might be incorporated into
official legal systems, see Stepan Wood, “Environmental Management Systems and
Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance,” (2002-03) 10
Buffalo Envtl. L.J. 129; Stepan Wood, “Green Revolution or Greenwash? Voluntary
Environmental Standards, Public Law and Private Authority in Canada,” in Law
Commission of Canada (ed.) New Perspectives on the Public-Private Divide (Vancouver:
UBC, 2003) 123; Errol Meidinger, “Environmental Certification Programs and U.S.
Environmental Law: Closer than You May Think” (2001) 31 Envtl L. Rptr. 10162.

75

See, e.g., Standards Council of Canada, above note 41, 8-9 (discussing options for
incorporating standards into regulation).

76

Indeed, the EMAS regulation had to be amended after ISO 14001:2004 was published,
to incorporate the changes to the standard.

77

In common law jurisdictions, for example, governmental authorities that are given rulemaking authority by legislation usually may not delegate the exercise of this power to
other bodies unless authorized to do so by their enabling legislation.
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regulators must choose a method of referencing standards that strikes an
appropriate balance.78
Standards may be referenced in a wide range of public policy instruments,
including statutes and regulations, permits, policies and guidelines, and
government-industry agreements.

G. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
One reason given by Ontario Ministry of the Environment officials for
drafting their own detailed EMS standard rather than incorporating
Canada’s national EMS standard, ISO 14001, by reference was that
environmental enforcement officials in the United States have done the
same thing. In fact, the American situation is quite different from
Ontario’s, and the differences are instructive.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance issued a guide on “compliancefocused environmental management systems” in 1997.79 This guide,
which was revised most recently in 2005 to reflect the publication of ISO
14001:2004, is designed for use in federal environmental enforcement
settlement agreements – that is, where the EPA agrees to settle a pending
civil or criminal enforcement action in return for the alleged violator’s
implementation of an EMS. It describes twelve elements of a compliancefocused EMS (CFEMS, for short), along with detailed model language for
inclusion in a consent decree embodying the settlement agreement.

78

The Standards Council of Canada identifies three preferred methods of reference: dated
identification of a specific issue of a standard, dated identification of a specific issue of a
standard as amended from time to time, and undated identification. Standards Council of
Canada, above note 41, 7. The latter two accommodate subsequent changes to the
standard, but reduce the regulator’s control and may raise issues of impermissible
delegation in some cases.

79

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance-Focused Environmental
Management System – Enforcement Agreement Guidance (Denver: National Enforcement
Investigations Center, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2005) (on file with
authors).
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This is quite different from taking an EMS into account when calculating
environmental penalties. First, the CFEMS guide is designed for very
serious cases, in which formal enforcement proceedings have been
commenced. In contrast EPs are intended for minor violations that are not
serious enough to warrant formal legal proceedings. In practice it appears
that the CFEMS guide has been used rarely, only for egregious or
persistent violations, and that target firms resent the intrusiveness and high
level of prescriptive detail of EMS consent decrees.80
Second, the CFEMS guide is intended for cases where firms are being
required to implement an EMS as a legally mandatory requirement
embodied in a court injunction (albeit with the defendant’s agreement),
while in the EP situation firms are being offered a small reward for having
already implemented an EMS voluntarily. In effect, a CFEMS is imposed
as a punishment for misbehaviour whereas an EP reduction is a reward for
responsible conduct. In the CFEMS situation, serious violators are being
brought into line with the EPA’s vision of what an EMS should be, in a
highly adversarial context. In the EPs situation, minor violators are being
rewarded for having voluntarily adopted a systematic approach to
environmental management. The high level of scrutiny and prescriptive
detail that might be appropriate for the former cases is not appropriate in
the latter.
Third, the US EPA’s compliance-focused EMS guide is not designed for
use in conjunction with administrative penalties (the American equivalent
of Ontario’s EPs). American federal legislation and publicly available
policies on administrative penalties are, in fact, silent on whether or how
EMSs are taken into account in calculating APs. However, the EPA’s
policy encouraging widespread use of EMSs81 and its long-standing policy
of incentives for self-policing82 make it reasonable to assume that EMS
80

Personal communication by Wood with long-time member of U.S. national mirror
committee on ISO 14001 (April 2007).

81

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, United States Environmental Protection
Agency Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems (15 Dec. 2005),
online: http://www.epa.gov/ems/position (visited 20 Aug. 2007).
82

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery,
Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations Final Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg.
66706 (Dec. 22, 1995).
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implementation might be given some degree of favourable consideration
in calculating the gravity portion of APs.
Finally, the CFEMS document emerged in a much more confrontational
atmosphere than exists in Canada. The CFEMS document was initially
issued in 1997, around the time the US EPA effectively walked away from
the ISO 14001 negotiating table. The EPA had participated in the
American mirror committee on ISO 14001 but for various reasons had
become increasingly frustrated with the standards development process
and the content of ISO 14001. The CFEMS document was drafted in this
highly charged, adversarial atmosphere.
In Canada, by contrast,
representatives of the federal and provincial governments have
participated actively in the national ISO 14001 mirror committee and as
Canadian delegates to international ISO meetings. They have participated
in these national and international EMS standards development processes
since the beginning in a spirit of constructive deliberation. The
antagonistic atmosphere in the U.S. has not been duplicated in Canada. In
short, the American CFEMS guide and the Ontario EPs penalty reduction
for EMSs are aimed at very different enforcement scenarios, emerged in
different contexts and reflect different enforcement philosophies.
Efforts to incorporate EMSs into regulatory systems have not been
restricted to the enforcement context. Governments in several countries
have also used EMSs as elements of voluntary environmental “leadership”
programs, designed to reward forward-looking firms for superior
environmental performance. One of the best known of these programs is
the US EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track, launched in
2000. When the Government of Ontario decided to draft its own EMS
requirements from scratch rather than incorporate ISO 14001 by reference,
it may have had Performance Track in mind. Performance Track does not
incorporate ISO 14001 by reference but specifies its own EMS
requirements. The program offers favourable publicity and modest
regulatory incentives to public and private sector organizations that
commit publicly to achieve beyond-compliance environmental
improvement in both regulated and non-regulated areas. The US EPA
made a conscious decision not to use ISO 14001 as the EMS component of
the program. It wanted to accommodate the variety of EMSs in use in the
US and to go beyond what ISO 14001 requires in certain respects. What is
significant for this article is that while Performance Track does not
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incorporate ISO 14001 by reference, neither does it replace it with a set of
detailed, highly prescriptive EMS requirements like the CFEMS Guide or
Ontario’s draft EP regulations. Instead it describes five very general EMS
elements and recognizes that the scope and formality of an EMS will vary
according to the organization’s size, sector, and complexity.83
The Performance Track program has attracted around 450 participating
organizations since its inception in 2000.84 By contrast, Ontario’s own
answer to Performance Track, the Environmental Leaders Program, has
attracted only five participants (four facilities and one industry
association) since it was inaugurated in 2002.85 Unlike the Performance
Track, the Environmental Leaders Program sets out three pages of
requirements for participating firms’ EMSs, including fourteen specified
elements and fairly detailed implementation requirements.86 The detail of
the program’s EMS requirements and uncertainty about how they relate to
established standards such as ISO 14001 are likely among the reasons for
the low uptake of the program by industry.
In short, the US experience does not support Ontario’s decision to write
its own detailed EMS requirements from scratch for the EP regulations.

H. DON’T REINVENT THE WHEEL
Nothing we have said is meant to suggest that standards eliminate the need
for regulation or that non-governmental standards-setting bodies are a
substitute for democratically elected governments. All we claim is that
there are compelling reasons for regulators, at every jurisdictional level, to
83

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Environmental Management System”,
National
Environmental
Performance
Track
web
site,
online:
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/program/ems.htm (visited 20 Aug. 2007).

84

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Basic Information,” National Environmental
Performance Track web site, online: http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/about.htm
(visited 24 Aug. 2007).

85

Ontario Ministry of the Environment, “Environmental Leaders Program,” online:
www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/general/leadership/index.htm.

86

Ontario Ministry of the Environment, A Framework for Ontario’s Environmental
Leaders Program (July 2004) (copy on file with the authors).
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look carefully at how incorporation of voluntary standards into regulation
might contribute to the achievement of public policy goals. In particular,
they should consider referring to existing, consensus-based nongovernmental standards rather than “reinventing the wheel” and drafting
their own standards from scratch.
Not only did the Ontario government choose not to incorporate ISO 14001
by reference into its regulatory scheme, the EMS standard it devised for
the draft regulations deviated substantially from ISO 14001. This brings
us to our second tip for regulators.
Tip 2. Strive for consistency. If a widely accepted standard already
exists on the subject, don’t create a host of unexplained
inconsistencies between the proposed regulation and the standard.
At first glance the EMS described in the draft regulations was broadly
consistent with ISO 14001. But even on a cursory examination, there
were numerous significant discrepancies in terminology, concepts, scope
and other features.
For the most part these discrepancies were
unacknowledged and unexplained, creating ambiguity as to how, if at all,
the requirements of ISO 14001 differed from those of the regulations. The
Guidance document accompanying the regulation attempted to explain
some differences and similarities between the regulatory EMS and ISO
14001. However, it compounded the problem by failing to identify many
discrepancies and giving the impression that the regulations and ISO
14001 were aligned more closely than their actual text would suggest.
This problem, had it persisted in the final regulations, would have
rendered largely counterproductive the province’s otherwise welcome
effort to incorporate EMSs into its regulatory system.

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE
There is no reason to believe that the problem was intentional. It appears
that the government intended the regulations to be consistent with ISO
14001 and that most of the discrepancies were inadvertent. The difficulty,
however, is that language is critical in international standards. Even very
small, seemingly inconsequential differences in text can give rise to
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inconsistency, ambiguity and uncertainty for implementing businesses,
conformity assessors and interested parties. Almost every word of ISO
14001 was the subject of intense domestic and international negotiation.
The resulting text reflects hard-won and often delicate compromise. What
appear to be minor departures from accepted terminology may thus be
perceived as major inconsistencies by EMS practitioners.
Standards are the product of countless hours of negotiation. They represent
a huge investment by governments, standards development organizations,
business firms, and the individuals who volunteer their time to develop
them. Single words, phrases or sentences are the subject of hundreds of
hours of deliberations and the resulting language, while seemingly
arbitrary, may reflect a delicate compromise achieved at great cost in time
and energy. ISO 14001 is full of examples. Key terms such as “prevention
of pollution,” “continual improvement,” “control and influence,”
“significance,” and “activities, products and services” were the subjects of
prolonged debate in the initial development and subsequent revision of
ISO 14001. The language ultimately agreed upon in international
standards often reflects very delicate compromises that would unravel if so
much as one word were changed or one comma moved.
Moreover, as a standard such as ISO 14001 spreads in the market and
users, consultants and conformity assessment professionals gain
experience with it, a whole set of understandings and expectations builds
up as to its meaning. Even minor departures from the established
terminology can inject substantial uncertainty into the market. Fear of
such disruption was one of the reasons that the recent revision of ISO
14001 was restricted to clarification of the intent of the original standard
and enhanced compatibility with the ISO 9001 quality management
system standard. “No new requirements” was the watchword of the
revision. Even if it was not carried out to the letter, 87 it reflected the
importance attached by the international EMS standards community to
ensuring continuity and predictability and not disturbing the delicate
compromises embodied in the language of the standard.
87

For a Canadian perspective on the differences between the 1996 and 2004 editions of
ISO 14001, see CSA Technical Committee on EMS, Guidance for Canadian Users
on Changes Between ISO 14001:1996 and ISO 14001:2004
(Mississauga, Ontario: CSA, 2004) (copy on file with authors).
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In light of this history, it is useful to examine the discrepancies between
the Ontario government’s “home-grown” EMS and ISO 14001. The homegrown EMS was set out in Schedule 1 to the draft regulations.88

B. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN ISO 14001 AND THE DRAFT EP
REGULATION
Many of the key concepts and terms in Schedule 1 were undefined, did not
appear in ISO 14001 and were unfamiliar to EMS practitioners.
Conversely, many of the concepts and terms found in ISO 14001, which
represent a hard-won international consensus on EMSs, were not found in
Schedule 1. For example:
•

•

The Schedule 1 EMS applied to a “plant,”89 whereas an ISO EMS
applies to an “organization”. The two terms were defined
differently, with the result that the physical and organizational
scope of an ISO 14001 EMS could well have been smaller or
larger than that of a Schedule 1 EMS. A regulated firm with an
ISO 14001 EMS already in place could have found that its scope
was different from that of Schedule 1. Questions could have arisen
whether the firm would have to redefine the scope of its EMS to
qualify for the EP reduction (which would be unlikely to merit the
investment), or exclude certain aspects of its EMS that fell outside
the scope of the Schedule for purposes of determining whether it
qualified for the EP reduction.
Rather than requiring an organization to identify the
“environmental aspects” of its “activities, products and services,”
to use the internationally recognized terminology of ISO 14001,
the Schedule required plants to list every “process, practice,
material, product or energy use” that may affect the natural
environment. While the Guidance document attempted to reassure
readers that this was “equivalent to the process identified in ISO

88

Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1.
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Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, s. 3.
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14001 for identifying aspects & significant aspects,”90 this was far
from clear. It was unclear, for instance, whether “process, practice,
material, product or energy use” includes services, which must be
included in an ISO 14001 EMS.
The identification of
environmental aspects and impacts and the determination of their
significance were among the most difficult and controversial issues
in the revision of ISO 14001.91 So much energy was expended in
reaching an international consensus on the appropriate language
that it is safe to say that any departure from it would have
occasioned considerable anxiety among thousands of
organizations, consultants and auditors that use ISO 14001.
Schedule 1 required plants to identify every process, practice,
material, product or energy use that may cause an “adverse effect,”
whereas ISO 14001 speaks of environmental “impacts.” While
this may seem like splitting hairs, in fact “adverse effect” is a term
of art in Ontario environmental legislation92 which does not mean
the same thing as ISO 14001’s “adverse impact” in all
circumstances.
The emergency preparedness and response provisions of Schedule
1 were aimed specifically at “spills,”93 whereas those in ISO 14001
are aimed at all environmental emergencies; and
Schedule 1 referred to “personnel,”94 which may not have the same
meaning as ISO 14001’s term “persons working for or on behalf of
the organization”. This was another hotly contested phrase in the
revision of ISO 14001 due to the interpretation by some
stakeholders that it automatically included suppliers.

Draft EP Guidance, supra note 8, 48.

91

This issue was so contentious during the recent revision process that its elaboration was
confined to ISO 14001’s companion guidance standard, ISO 14004. Developing agreed
guidance on “aspects, impacts and significance” consumed almost three years, hundreds
of pages of comments, and untold volunteer hours. Johannson, who chaired the ISO task
group on this issue, tallied more than 200 hours alone managing the international
negotiation process.

92

“Adverse effect” is a legislatively defined term of art with a very particular meaning in
Ontario. Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, ss. 1, 14.
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Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 10.
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Ibid., ss. 2, 12, 15.

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

44

[VOL. 04 NO. 02

Moving from scope and terminology to the content of EMS requirements,
several of the requirements of Schedule 1 differed from those of ISO
14001, usually without explanation. In some cases the requirements of
Schedule 1 appeared to be weaker than those of ISO 14001. Three
examples will suffice:
•

•

•

ISO 14001 seeks to promote environmentally positive
outcomes by requiring an organization to identify significant
environmental aspects and impacts within the scope of the
EMS, both adverse and beneficial. Schedule 1 only required
plants to identify those with adverse effects.95
Schedule 1 was limited to environmental aspects over which
the plant has “control,”96 while ISO 14001 applies both to those
the organization controls and those over which the organization
determines it has an influence. ISO 14001 has the potential to
reach farther up or down the value chain than Schedule 1. The
question of “control and influence” was another controversial
drafting issue in the initial development of ISO 14001 and
throughout its revision. The delicacy of the compromise
reflected in the language of ISO 14001 on this issue cannot be
overemphasized.
The provisions of Schedule 1 on training, awareness and
competence97 reflected an outdated approach, borrowed from
the first edition of ISO 14001, focused on task-specific formal
training. This approach was rejected explicitly in the recent
revision of ISO 14001 and replaced with a more holistic
approach that emphasizes competence more broadly and the
importance of educating personnel as to why conformity with
the EMS matters and what might happen when established
procedures are not followed.

95

Ibid., s. 3.

96

Ibid.

97

Ibid., s. 12.
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The EPs guidance document neither acknowledged these apparent
downward departures from ISO 14001 nor offered any explanation for
them.
There were also discrepancies between Schedule 1 and ISO 14001 in
relation to EMS audits. Schedule 1 would have required a plant’s EMS to
be audited against the requirements of the regulation rather than against a
standard such as ISO 14001. This would have blurred the line between
EMS audits and regulatory compliance audits and led to confusion in the
environmental auditing community. EMS auditors are trained to conduct
EMS audits, against recognized EMS standards. The draft regulations
would have required a regulatory compliance audit, to be conducted
against an EMS document that differed significantly from the EMS
standards with which EMS auditors are familiar. It was not clear who
would accredit auditors to conduct these audits, what training auditors
would need, nor whether their insurers would be willing to provide
coverage for such audits. It was possible that the private market would be
unwilling or unable to supply the certifications contemplated by the
regulations. This issue was not addressed in the draft regulations or
guidance. It appears that research commissioned by the government had
not investigated these points.
Finally, the Schedule 1 EMS included requirements that went beyond the
requirements of ISO 14001. The government explicitly acknowledged two
of these additional requirements. First, Schedule 1 required a policy
commitment to “pollution prevention” (also known as “P2”), i.e., the use
of “processes, practices, materials, products and energy that avoid or
minimize the creation of pollutants and wastes at the source,” 98 which is
stronger than ISO 14001’s requirement of a commitment to “prevention of
pollution” (POP). POP is defined as including recycling and end-of-pipe
pollution control. This was another hotly debated issue within Canada and
in the international forum, pitting Europe against the United States, and
developed against developing countries. Second, Schedule 1 required an
external audit of the EMS and a certification by the external auditor that
the regulatory EMS meets all the requirements of Schedule 1.99 As ISO
98

Ibid., s. 1.
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Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 14.
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14001 is voluntary, it does not require external audits or third party
certification. It is up to the adopting organization to choose how to
demonstrate its conformity to the standard. ISO 14001 recognizes four
options: self-declaration, second-party assessment (by a customer or other
interested party), confirmation of self-declaration by an external party, and
third-party certification. We will have more to say about these options in
the next section.100 For now we simply wish to note the inconsistency
between Schedule 1 and ISO 14001.
In addition to the two additional requirements acknowledged by the
government, there were several it did not acknowledge:
•

•

100

An increased emphasis on documentation and written
procedures.101 This was diametrically opposed to the five years
of effort leading to the international consensus that
documentation requirements in ISO 14001 had to be reduced to
make EMSs more accessible to small organizations and further
shift the focus toward results rather than paperwork.
A requirement to rank all environmental aspects based on the
significance of their potential adverse effect.102 ISO 14001
requires organizations to determine significant environmental
aspects. It does not require organizations to engage in an
explicit ranking exercise. Determination of significance relies
heavily on judgment and informed discretion, and is affected
by a host of variables.103 Requiring organizations to rank their
significant aspects would add little value.

See n. 107 and accompanying text.

101

Almost every section of Schedule 1 required the development of written procedures.
Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, passim.
102
103

Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 3.

CSA published a guidance document on this topic. Canadian Standards Association,
Plus 1145: A Guide to Identifying Significant Environmental Aspects (Rexdale, Ontario:
CSA, 1999).
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The requirement that all environmental targets be
quantifiable,104 whereas ISO 14001 recognizes that this is not
always practicable.
Frequent use of words such as “every,” “all,” “any,” or “each,”
which would result in nonconformity if even one event or item
is missed.

To recapitulate, the government’s intent was not to create an EMS
inconsistent with ISO 14001. But that is, in fact, what it did. It drafted an
entirely new EMS specification that was full of (admittedly inadvertent)
discrepancies in language, concepts, terminology and requirements
compared to the leading internationally recognized EMS standard. And it
failed to explain or acknowledge most of these discrepancies. This could
only be expected to lead to confusion, anxiety and resistance among
regulated industries and environmental management professionals.
We are not suggesting that governments should simply swallow nongovernmental voluntary standards lock, stock and barrel. Far from it:
there are many circumstances when public policy legitimately demands
more than what voluntary standards have to offer. This brings us to our
third tip.
Tip 3. Make any extra requirements clear. If an existing widely
accepted standard does not, on its own, meet all the public policy
goals of the proposed regulation, identify as clearly as possible
how the standard is deficient and what more is required to meet
public policy objectives.
As we noted in the previous section, to qualify for an EP reduction,
regulated firms would have had to meet additional requirements in their
EMSs beyond what is required by ISO 14001. This is not remarkable in
itself. It is a government’s prerogative to ask firms to do more than just
demonstrate conformity to a voluntary standard in return for regulatory
benefits. They may, for instance, want firms to put greater emphasis on
pollution prevention (versus POP), environmental performance
104

Draft EP Regulation, supra note 8, Schedule 1, s. 4.
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improvement, public transparency or community consultation than ISO
14001 requires. Many firms already exceed both ISO 14001’s
requirements and governments’ expectations in these or other areas,
because this enables them to improve their efficiency or competitiveness,
increase productivity, satisfy customer or trade association requirements,
improve community relations, or fulfil their own commitments to
environmental leadership. At the same time, incentives and performance
vary greatly across firms and sectors, and firms’ private goals may not
correspond with public policy goals. Governments may find existing
voluntary standards insufficient to fulfil the public policy goals they wish
to pursue via regulation.
This brings us to the critical point. When an existing widely recognized
standard does not, on its own, meet all the regulator’s public policy
objectives, the regulator should specify any extra or different requirements
clearly, so that firms, auditors, regulators and other interested parties can
readily identify what is expected. They should also provide a rationale for
the extra or different requirements, so that firms, auditors, and others can
assess the value of the “extra mile”. For the most part the Ontario
government failed to do either of these things when promulgating its draft
EP regulations.

A. ISO 14001 PLUS…WHAT?
We have already laid out what we identified as the extra requirements of
the draft regulatory EMS compared to ISO 14001. Two of these were
obvious and were acknowledged explicitly in the accompanying guidance
document. These were a strengthened commitment to pollution prevention
and a requirement for an external third-party audit and certification.
Others were implicit, unacknowledged and uncertain in scope and effect.
The only extra requirement for which the government publicly offered a
rationale was the commitment to pollution prevention. The guidance
document accompanying the regulations explained the choice of pollution
prevention rather than ISO’s broader “prevention of pollution” as follows:
pollution prevention is a process that regularly and systematically
examines root causes of all wastes generated and seeks to eliminate
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the causes of pollution rather than treating the symptoms. Pollution
prevention is the preferred approach at the top of the
environmental management hierarchy, followed by re-use,
recycling, control, treatment, disposal, with remediation and cleanup being the least preferred option.105
The government of Ontario was not alone in insisting on a commitment to
pollution prevention in return for granting regulatory benefits to firms with
EMSs.
Public authorities in several jurisdictions, including the
governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States, have specified this
as an expectation for the use of EMSs to achieve public policy goals.106
The government offered no rationale, however, for the requirement of an
external audit and certification. ISO 14001 does not require an external
audit or independent third-party certification of conformity. It does not
specify the frequency of internal audits, nor does it state that all elements
of the EMS must be reviewed in every audit. ISO 14001:2004 recognizes
four conformity assessment options, designed to suit the varying needs of
the market. Some have a shorter audit cycle than others. An organization
may demonstrate conformity to ISO 14001 by:
1) making a self-determination and self-declaration, or
2) seeking confirmation of its conformance by parties having an
interest in the organization, such as customers, or
3) seeking confirmation of its self-declaration by a party external
to the organization, or
4) seeking certification/registration of its environmental
management system by an external organization.107
Option 1 is a first-party self-assessment process. Option 2 is an
assessment by someone having an interest in the organization, commonly
referred to as a second-party or supplier audit. Options 3 and 4 are
105

Draft EP Guidance, supra note 8, 52-53.
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North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Improving
Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: 10 Elements of Effective Management
Systems (Montreal: Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2000) 3.
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ISO 14001:2004, Introduction.
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performed by independent external parties. Option 3 was added in 2004
largely to accommodate the EnviroReady Report process,108 in which a
professional accountant with specific training is recognized to confirm the
presence of the ISO 14001 elements. This is cheaper and more
streamlined than third-party certification. It was created specifically to
address the needs of SMEs by making external confirmation of ISO 14001
implementation attractive and feasible for them. The EnviroReady Report
process is focused exclusively on ISO 14001; it was not designed to be
applied to other EMSs. Option 4 is formal third-party certification or
registration by an accredited ISO 14001 certifier. This is typically the
costliest of the four options.109 Most SMEs have shunned it for reasons of
cost and culture.110
The draft regulations only appeared to contemplate third-party
certification (Option 4), despite the barriers just discussed No rationale
was offered publicly for this restrictive and costly approach, which would
effectively have disqualified the vast majority of Ontario firms from
eligibility for the EMS-based EP reduction.111 It is possible to imagine
reasons for the government’s position. For instance, it may have believed
that only formal third-party certification would provide adequate
verification of firms’ EMSs. This is a widely held but controversial view.
Many NGOs and governments insist on third-party certification as the
only effective guarantee of the credibility of firms’ claims about
implementation of voluntary environmental initiatives. This insistence
may be well-founded in specific cases, but it may be misplaced in others.
First, other forms of conformity assessment may provide adequate
108

“EnviroReady Report” is a registered trademark of _______. Information on the
process is available at www.14000registry.com. Johannson is the coordinating lead
person responsible for the development of the EnviroReady Report process and has a
commercial interest in it.
109

See Table 2 and accompanying discussion, below.
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Auditors in some countries have offered clustered ISO 14001 audits, which bring the
cost per company down by auditing several organizations at once. We are unaware of any
examples of this in Canada.
111

Granted, the EPs scheme is currently restricted to a small number of large industrial
facilities for many of which formal EMS certification is not a huge financial obstacle, but
the government plans to expand the scheme to other facilities and sectors over time.
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credibility, depending on the circumstances. There is a tendency to
assume a binary choice between self-declaration and third-party
certification, overlooking the existence of the other options mentioned
earlier. Second, many firms find that any credibility gains they obtain
from third-party certification are not worth the high cost. Third,
accounting scandals such as Enron and Worldcom remind us that thirdparty auditors themselves may not always be as objective and independent
as we would like. ISO 14001 has not been immune from such problems.
Concerns have occasionally been raised about the credibility of some ISO
14001 registrars or certificates. The same is true of other voluntary
certification systems.
Our goal here is not to settle the debate once and for all, but to note that
the Ontario government failed to articulate any rationale for demanding
third party certification. Nor did it acknowledge the associated trade-offs
such as the higher cost to regulated firms. As a result it set a precedent that
effectively excluded SMEs.
The European EMAS regulation is an interesting contrast. It incorporates
ISO 14001 as its EMS specification, and specifies separately the extra
requirements the European Commission and Parliament consider
necessary for facilities participating in this voluntary scheme.112 We are
not suggesting that Ontario should adopt the same requirements, only that
it follow the example of being clear and up-front about what additional
requirements above and beyond ISO 14001 are required to achieve public
policy goals.
While it may not have been the government’s intention to create a system
that is inconsistent with ISO 14001, this would have been the result of the
draft EP regulations. The creation of a parallel, partially overlapping EMS
specification with different scope, terminology and requirements that
deviate from the standard could have led to a number of potential
scenarios. First, the market might simply have ignored the regulatory
112

See European Commission, “EMAS – The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme,”
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm (visited 24 Aug. 2007). The main
differences
between
EMAS
and
ISO
14001
are
summarized
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/tools/faq_en.htm#difference (visited 24 Aug.
2007).
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EMS. The detailed EMS specification would languish in the law books,
but no firms would attempt to implement it or claim the associated penalty
reduction. This would have been the most likely outcome of promulgation
of the draft regulations, in our view. It would have been a poor return for
the public purse indeed. Second, in the unlikely event that the market took
the regulatory EMS seriously, the result would have been uncertainty,
confusion and extra cost for regulated firms. At a minimum it would have
added substantial extra costs for regulated facilities, regulatory authorities
and auditors, in all likelihood exceeding the rather modest 5% penalty
reduction.113 Third, the confusion and anxiety around the regulatory EMS
might have put some firms off EMSs and ISO 14001 altogether. This
would have been an entirely counterproductive result.
The implications of departing from an internationally accepted
standardized approach to EMS would not necessarily be contained to the
province of Ontario. The draft standard drew attention and scrutiny from
European countries, making it a potential trade issue. Ontario was thrust
inadvertently before an international audience, which awaited the verdict
of this particular twist on the standard with considerable interest.

B. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The development of Ontario’s EP regulations presented a welcome and
long-overdue opportunity for a serious public conversation about the role
of ISO 14001 in the pursuit of public policy goals, and the relationship
between voluntary standardization and official regulation generally. This
would have been a good chance to articulate what should be expected
from regulated entities in exchange for favourable regulatory treatment.
113

The incremental costs of complying with the EMS component of the EP Regulations
would likely have been substantial. An external audit of a plant against the EMS outlined
in Schedule 1 would include more and different criteria than an audit that tests a user’s
conformance to ISO 14001. There would also be an increase in costs related to the
external audit and the possibility that professional auditors would refuse to offer auditing
services against this EMS. These costs would likely far outweigh the benefits of
complying with Schedule 1, namely a 5% reduction in the gravity component of the EP.
As a result all the work the government put into drafting the EMS component of the
proposal would have been for naught, because no companies would have gone to the
expense and uncertainty of implementing a Schedule 1 EMS.
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Such a conversation should have considered, among other things, how the
answers to these questions might vary with different regulatory contexts.
What is appropriate in an environmental enforcement context (as in the
case of EPs) may not, for instance, apply to voluntary environmental
leadership programs such as the US EPA’s Performance Track or
Ontario’s Environmental Leaders program. What works for large
regulated entities may not work for SMEs. And what is appropriate for
one regulated sector may not be appropriate for others.
Such a conversation should also have considered the mounting empirical
evidence about the effects of EMSs on environmental performance, legal
compliance, financial results and competitiveness.114 Furthermore, it
should have considered the inevitable trade-offs involved in any decision
about departing from existing consensus-based non-governmental
standards. Extra requirements should be justified not only in terms of the
public policy benefits they promise to achieve, but also against the
competing benefits of uniform standards and a well-functioning national
and international standards system. They should also consider the
potential negative impacts of departing from internationally accepted
standards on business certainty and competitiveness.
The government did not take this opportunity. Instead of taking the
objections it had received as a reason to engage in a serious discussion of
the government’s public policy objectives and ISO 14001’s potential
contribution to their realization, it simply rewrote the draft regulations to
remove the detailed EMS in Schedule 1 and incorporate ISO 14001 and
Responsible Care as the regulatory standards. While this was probably
welcomed by many stakeholders in industry, it was no substitute for the
serious reflection that is needed on the role of ISO 14001 and other
voluntary EMS standards in regulation. We hope this article spurs interest
among relevant governments (not least Ontario’s) to devote the time and
resources to foster this dialogue.
Here is what the final Ontario regulations say about the EP reduction for
an EMS:

114

E.g. Prakash & Potosky, above n. 7.
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17. The Director shall grant a reduction to the gravity
component equal to 5 per cent of the gravity component if, at the
time of the contravention, the regulated person had in place an
environmental management system for the plant that was audited
within three years before the contravention, and the audit
confirmed one of the following:
1. That at the time of the audit,
i. the environmental management system was certified as
meeting the standard set out in the document entitled
“Environmental management systems –Requirements
with guidance for use” and designated as CAN/CSAISO 14001:04, published by the Canadian Standards
Association, as amended from time to time, by an
environmental management systems registrar that has
been accredited by,
A. the Standards Council of Canada, or
B. an accreditation body outside of Canada that is a
signatory to the International Accreditation Forum
Multilateral Recognition Arrangement, and
ii. the certification is recorded in a registry maintained by
the registrar.
2. That at the time of the audit, the environmental
management system was determined to be compliant with
the standard set out in the document referred to in
paragraph 1 by a person who,
i. is not an employee at the plant or a contractor who
routinely works at the plant,
ii. audits according to a code of practice that conforms
with the document entitled “Guidelines for quality
and/or environmental management systems auditing”
and designated as CSA/ISO 19011:2003, published by
the Canadian Standards Association, as amended from
time to time, and
iii. is certified by,
A. an auditing certification body that has been
accredited by the Standards Council of Canada,
including the Canadian Environmental Certification
Approvals Board, or
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B. a body outside of Canada that is a signatory to the
International Accreditation Forum Multilateral
Recognition Arrangement.
3. That at the time of the audit, the environmental
management system was verified as meeting the
requirements [of the Responsible Care Program] published
by the Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association, as
amended from time to time, by a person authorized by the
Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association to audit
environmental management systems.115
Although the language is convoluted, its effect is simple. To qualify for an
EP reduction, a plant must have an EMS that is:
1) certified to ISO 14001 by an accredited ISO 14001 registrar,
2) audited by an independent external auditor who determines it to
conform to ISO 14001, or
3) verified by an authorized Responsible Care verifier to meet the
requirements of the chemical industry’s Responsible Care
program.
Gone is the detailed, home-grown EMS specification with all the
discrepancies and ambiguities that differentiated it from ISO 14001. Gone
is the requirement to audit the EMS against the regulation, which would
have blurred the distinction between a regulatory compliance audit and an
EMS audit. That much is to be congratulated.
But the government’s wholesale retreat from almost all elements of the
draft EMS specification left several questions unanswered. Why did it
abandon the requirement for a commitment to pollution prevention?
Presumably it had given this issue serious thought and had cogent reasons
for this departure from ISO 14001. The same might be asked of the other
“ISO 14001-extras” that were dropped from the final version, including
the emphasis on written procedures, the requirement to rank-order all
significant environmental aspects, and the requirement to quantify all
environmental targets.
115

O. Reg. 222/07, s. 17.
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On the other hand, why did it retain the requirement for an external audit
or ISO 14001 registration? The final regulations went some way toward
meeting the objections discussed earlier, but stopped short of
accommodating conformity assessment options that are accessible to the
vast majority of SMEs. While the regulations were geared to large, pointsource polluters, they set a precedent that will do nothing to help SMEs.
In short, instead of specifying more carefully how its vision of an
acceptable EMS for purposes of the EP regulations differed from the
requirements of ISO 14001, at the eleventh hour the government simply
abandoned most of the additional requirements it had initially proposed,
passing up an opportunity for a much-needed conversation about the role
of voluntary EMS standards in regulation.
Perhaps some of this difficulty could have been avoided had the
government taken different steps in the run-up to this regulatory initiative.
This brings us to our fourth tip.
Tip 4. Connect with the experts. Consult relevant
development committees when developing regulations

standards

The Ministry of the Environment engaged in a year-long public
consultation process on EPs between September 2005 and September
2006.116 According to the government, the consultation process had five
phases. Phase 1 consisted of private “pre-consultations” with key industry
and non-industry stakeholders.
Phase 2 featured broad-based
consultations across the province and ended with identification of key
issues for future work. Phase 3 involved the distillation and reporting of
stakeholder input and establishment of a MOE-stakeholder working group
to hold focused discussions on the key issues identified in Phase 2. The
working group was selected based on input from industry associations,
116

Ontario Ministry of the Environment, above n. 25. In addition, the government
commissioned research into the status of EMS adoption in Ontario and various market
participants’ views of EMS standards. The researcher must have consulted a very limited
range of sources, because the research does not appear to have turned up most of the
information and concerns identified in this article, which were well known in the EMS
standards community.
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community-based organizations and ENGOs that had been involved in the
earlier consultations. While in theory all stakeholder groups were to be
represented equally, the majority of members came from large regulated
industries.117 In Phase 4, the MOE-stakeholder working group worked
intensively over several months to explore issues, review best practices
and make detailed comments and recommendations. Finally, in Phase 5,
the government reviewed and analyzed the working group’s comments
and recommendations. It then prepared the draft regulations for posting on
the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR) registry.
At no point in this process did the government notify or consult the
relevant organs of the National Standards System – in particular, the
CSA’s multi-stakeholder committee responsible for development and
maintenance of national environmental management systems standards.
No formal channels of communication were opened between the
government and the committee until after the draft regulations were
released for public comment, when Ministry officials accepted the
committee’s invitation to meet and discuss the EMS component of the
regulations.
This was probably an inadvertent oversight, the product of a lack of
awareness in the relevant government agencies of the existence and role of
the National Standards System and the EMS committee. But the oversight
was serious since it deprived the government of what was undoubtedly the
country’s largest collective reservoir of expertise on EMS standards
development. It was also inconsistent with one of the fundamental
principles of the Canadian standards system, a principle shared with most
other jurisdictions: that there should be ongoing cooperation and
communication between standards development bodies and public
authorities, especially in subject areas on which regulation and
standardization overlap. As the Standards Council of Canada recently
stated:

117

The working group had eight members representing large industrial polluters, four
ENGO members, one local community group representative, one member representing
health units and one MOE official who acted as chair. Ontario Ministry of the
Environment, above n. 25
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The effective development of a standard suitable for incorporation
by reference in a legislative instrument requires that a cooperative
effort between the regulatory authority and the standards
development committee be established from the outset.118
To reap the many benefits of consensus-based non-governmental
standards development activities and avoid the many potential pitfalls
described in this article, governments need to ensure that their key policy
development and legislative drafting personnel are aware of relevant
standards development committees. They need to consult with those
committees when developing regulations on subjects on which standards
exist. This should be a routine part of public policy development.
Ad hoc, project-specific consultation is only one way of engaging with and
reaping the benefits of the voluntary standards development process.
Another is to participate actively in the work of standards development
committees.
Tip 5. Get involved in voluntary standards development. Participate in
the work of relevant standards development committees to keep
abreast of relevant issues and influence the content of standards on
an ongoing basis.
The Standards Council of Canada puts it simply:
Representatives of interested regulatory authorities should be
active participants on the standards development committee. If for
reasons of balance, time, or distance this is not possible, they
should be associate or corresponding members who can make
comments and provide input.
For several years the Ontario Ministry of the Environment had an active
participant on the national EMS standards committee, but this
participation lapsed around 2000. Periodic entreaties by the committee to
renew the Ministry’s participation were not acted upon. Other government
118

Standards Council of Canada, supra note 41, 4.
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officials have also sat on the committee, including representatives of the
federal government, other provinces and municipalities. Because of the
“balanced matrix” rules for the composition of standards committees,119 it
would not be possible to accommodate representatives of all potentially
interested government bodies. This does not necessarily prevent them
from participating as observers, receiving committee correspondence, or
obtaining periodic updates.
Participating in the work of standards development committees offers
numerous potential advantages to government officials. These include
keeping abreast of the latest developments and innovations in the
marketplace, and influencing the content of standards in directions
consistent with public policy goals. One of the biggest obstacles to
government participation in standards development bodies is limited
resources. This was due mainly to the massive budget and staff cuts that
were experienced in the neo-conservative atmosphere of the 1990s in
many countries. These cuts were especially severe in environmental
ministries. In these circumstances many government officials were simply
spread too thin to take advantage of participation in standards committees.
Nonetheless, some of the deepest cuts have been restored and many
government agencies are recovering from their direst straits.
If the concept of smart regulation is to be taken seriously, with its
emphasis on harnessing non-governmental resources and fostering the
reflexive, self-regulatory capacities of regulated communities in the
service of public goals, governments need to put a higher strategic and
operational priority on participation in the work of voluntary standards
development.
Tip 6. Consider the needs of small business. Design regulations in a
way that addresses the special characteristics and challenges of the
SMEs that represent around 98% of the business community.
With this we come to the last of our tips and what is perhaps the toughest
challenge of smart regulation: to design regulation in a way that
119

See above, n. 57-60 and accompanying discussion.
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effectively enlists small business in the quest for sustainable development.
Both governments and standardization bodies have failed to engage small
business. For small business this is a double-edged sword. They need the
help, but they don’t necessarily want the attention. Yet, to resolve the most
pressing environmental problems of the contemporary period and
accelerate the transformation toward a sustainable society, it will be
necessary to engage and mobilize small business.
Neither the draft nor the final environmental penalties regulations make
any effort to address small business. As mentioned, the Ontario EPs
scheme only applies to large facilities in nine industry sectors that
discharge contaminated effluent to a surface water course or private
effluent treatment plant. We are not suggesting that the solution is to
extend the EPs regime to all regulated facilities in the province, big and
small. But the solution must involve more than simply ignoring small
business. We admit that this might sound like the pot calling the kettle
black, because the environmental standardization community has also
failed to respond to the needs and challenges of small business. One could
say that they have failed to understand the needs of their customer (a mark
against them from a quality management perspective), but they do it
consistently.

A. THE SLEEPING GIANT OF THE SUSTAINABILITY STORY
Small business is the sleeping giant of the sustainability story. It has been
largely ignored by environmental regulation. On the one hand, small
businesses should be happy about this, since regulatory compliance tends
to be considerably more expensive for small than large businesses on a per
capita basis.120 Yet, the majority of Canadian small businesses believe in
sustainability.121 This giant is starting to stir and is likely to come fully
awake soon. And when it does awaken – no matter in which direction it
120

Laura Jones, et al., Rated R: Prosperity Restricted by Red Tape (Toronto: Canadian
Federation
of
Independent
Business,
2005),
online:
www.cfib.ca/research/reports/RatedR.pdf.
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Matthew Armstrong et al., Achieving Eco-Prosperity: SMEs’ Perspectives on the
Environment (Toronto: CFIB, 2007), online: www.cfib.ca/research/reports/rr3039.pdf.
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moves – it is likely to have an influence on environment and society that
belies its low profile. In Canada, small businesses rarely grab media
headlines. They may not be much in the public eye, but they are well
connected to the community. They may not have global brands to protect,
but their customers trust them more than they do national or multinational
chains. Small businesses cannot afford to engage in massive publicity
exercises, but they have their networks. They typically do not engage in
large scale political lobbying. While associations exist to lobby on behalf
of small business, 122 in most countries these are dwarfed by the number
and resources of big business lobbyists. SMEs have been largely ignored
as the silent majority, and that is a serious error for both regulators and
standards developers. SMEs are incredibly numerous, widely dispersed
throughout society, and very closely integrated into the local fabric of the
communities in which they operate. We ignore them at our peril.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) make up the vast majority of
business organizations in the world. In many developing countries they
dominate the local economy. Even in advanced industrialized countries
where large business firms appear prevalent, SMEs represent an
overwhelming majority of business organizations and account for a
substantial portion of economic activity. They employ a great number of
Canadians. SMEs make up between 95% and 98% of Canadian businesses
(or 1.04 million of Canada’s approximately 1.07 million legally
constituted employer businesses),123 and contribute between 45% and 60%
of Canada’s Gross Domestic Product.124 Canada has a very large microenterprise base – i.e, legally constituted employer enterprises with fewer
than five people. In addition, there are another 1.2 million business
entities in Canada without full-time payroll. These may be cottage
industries, seasonal ventures or simply one-person outfits, augmenting
their human resource needs with part-time or contract help. Small
business represents the foundation of a national economy, and its viability
has profound impacts on the health and prosperity of the national
122

In Canada, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business is the principal voice for
small business, online: www.cfib.ca.
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Industry Canada, above n. 14.

The range varies from source to source and depends partly on the definition of small
business used.
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economy. Without small business, no economy can evolve to become
sustainable.
The vast majority of environmental regulation in Canada and many other
countries is simply not designed for or applied on a substantial scale to
small business. And when it is applied to small business, small business
bears a disproportionate share of the cost of compliance. Research
conducted by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB)
indicates that regulation imposes a higher financial burden on small
business than their larger counterparts (see Table 1). This results in an
uneven playing field and unequal costs as a fraction of annual turnover.
Number
of
employees

Low
range

Upper
range

Estimated Annual
Turnover

1-4

Annual
compliance
costs per
employee
$5,317

$5,317

$21,260

5-19
20-49

$2,844
$1,922

$14,222
$38,444

$54,036
$94,178

50-99
100 +

$1,422
$1,104

$71,100
$110,400

$140,778
$5,164,512

$250,000 to
$1,000,000
NA
Under
$5,000,000
NA
$19,331,009,000

Compliance
cost as % of
Annual
Turnover
2.13%
.77% to
1.88%
.27%

Table 1. Comparative Financial Burden of Regulation on Canadian Businesses
Source: Extrapolated from data contained in Laura Jones et al., Rated R: Prosperity
Restricted by Red Tape (Toronto: CFIB, 2005).

Conventional environmental regulation typically disregards the
organizational and cultural characteristics of small business. The vast
majority of small businesses do not have formalized management systems,
but operate informally with heavy reliance on personal knowledge,
memory and informal interpersonal networks based on trust. Multitasking is pervasive, with one or a few individuals performing roles that
would be divided among multiple people or divisions in large firms.
Initiative, adaptability and self-reliance are at a premium in this
atmosphere. A very high value is placed on autonomy and independence.
Governments and laws tend to be viewed with a high level of skepticism.
Government officials and regulations are typically resented as unwelcome
intrusions at worst, or ignored as irrelevant at best.
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Small businesses are not against environmental protection. They are
typically supportive of good environmental laws; it’s just that many
haven’t seen a good example. Small business owners are less likely than
large firms to establish constructive, ongoing, long-term relationships with
environmental licensing and inspection officials. They are far less likely
to engage in lobbying of policy makers than are large firms. They operate
on ultra slim margins. The profit motive often plays a smaller role in
SMEs than in larger enterprises. Many SMEs exist simply to procure a
modest living for their principals. Others exist because their principals had
no other choice than to strike out on their own, having been made
redundant by downsizing or closure of larger private or public sector
entities.
Command regulation, with its emphasis on prohibition, detailed technical
prescriptions and quasi-criminal enforcement, is ill-suited to the
informality of small business. It tends to aggravate the antagonism toward
government latent in many small business owners, leading to greater
resistance rather than voluntary compliance.
While there have been increases in recent years in transparency and public
participation in environmental law, law-making processes remain largely
inaccessible to SMEs and ordinary citizens. This is even truer of
regulations than statutes. While statutes must be debated, passed and
amended publicly by elected representatives in legislatures, regulations
and other subsidiary legislative instruments are developed, approved and
amended by the executive branch of government. In Canada and other
jurisdictions with parliamentary systems of government, the party holding
the most seats in the legislature controls the executive. This has led to a
tendency to enact very vague, general and discretionary environmental
statutes that leave most of the details to be worked out via regulations and
administrative decision-making. This has often been accompanied by a
tendency to work out the content of environmental regulation through
closed-door negotiations between governments and major industrial
polluters.125
125

E.g. Michael Howlett, "Policy Instruments and Implementation Styles: The Evolution
of Instrument Choice in Canadian Environmental Policy" in Debora VanNijnatten and
Robert Boardman, eds., Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 2002) 25.
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Governments have made increasing use of public notice and comment
procedures in recent years, but this is still not as common or robust as one
might hope. More frequently, the key discussions still occur in closed door
consultations with industry and a small range of other organized
stakeholders. These consultations are confined to those stakeholders who
understand where and when to intervene and have the necessary resources
to do so. Small business by and large has neither the time nor the
resources to engage in these processes. As a result, regulations are
unlikely to overcome these hurdles unless an easier access process is
developed. Even if design challenges are overcome, at the end of the day
their application by regulators knowledgeable about how small business
operates must be addressed. Only when both these aspects are addressed
will Canada’s regulatory scheme be sensitive to the needs and resource
constraints of small business.

B. THE SMALL BUSINESS SUCCESSION CRISIS
These problems with environmental regulation do not exist in a static
historical setting. Demographic trends in Canada have conspired to create
an impending crisis in the small business community and an
unprecedented opportunity to help this sector embrace sustainable
business practices. The Canadian small business community is aging.
Sixty-six percent of Canada’s small business owners intend to retire over
the next ten years.126 This translates into approximately 680,000
companies. Given the sheer number of companies involved in this
transition, this represents a huge socio-economic upheaval. Approximately
37% of Canadian small business owners want to sell their businesses on
the open market and another 26% want to sell or transfer their businesses
within the family in the near future. 4% intend to wind down their
business. A further 26% have not figured out any kind of exit vision. The
remaining 7% responded “other”, which may or may not indicate that they

126

Doug Bruce, “The Context: Turning Risks into Opportunities” in Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants, Succession Planning Toolkit for Business Owners (Toronto:
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2006).
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have planned their succession.127 Between these last two categories, this
means that over the next ten years up to 178,000 Canadian small
businesses are uncertain about what to do
We are entering a protracted buyer’s market. It will continue for a period
of ten to eighteen years. In the present era, when environmental protection
is a top of mind public issue, evidence of a well managed company will
include environmental management and quite possibly environmental
performance front and centre on a buyer’s checklist.
The presence of a robust and credible environmental management system
(EMS) could become a screening tool for a prospective buyer or even a
deciding factor when other factors are equal. So why are small businesses
not racing to adopt ISO 14001? Let us take a bird’s eye view of the
situation.128

C. SMALL BUSINESS AND ISO 14001
First, most small business owners have not even heard of the standard.129
Of those who have heard, the standard is marketed to them as something
to be adopted for third-party certification. Certification, however, is a large
127

Doug Bruce and Derek Picard, Succession Can Breed Success; SME Succession and
Canada’s
Economic
Prosperity
(Toronto:
CFIB,
2005),
online:
www.cfib.ca/research/reports/rr3007.pdf.
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While this situation is discussed in the context of Canada, the challenge of succession
is not exclusive to that country, nor is the failure of ISO to understand the nature and
culture of its potential customer, small business. According to the International Finance
Corporation, there are approximately 143 million small businesses in the world.
International Finance Corporation, above n. 65. The issue of succession may not be
pertinent to some transition economies or developing countries. Other related drivers, like
the trade impact of large-scale adoption of ISO 14001 or supply chain pressures, may pull
small business in these countries toward the standard.
129

The Canadian Federation of Independent Business has surveyed its members’
awareness of ISO 14001 a number of times. Johansson’s firm, E2M, has conducted
periodic surveys on EMS and SMEs since 1994. The results are consistent. The vast
majority of small business owners, like the general public, has either not heard about ISO
14001, or doesn’t recall it.
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expense for small business as a fraction of annual turnover (see Table 2).
The price tag alone tends to shut the door on their interest.
Organization
size/sales

Initial
document
review

Follow-up
reviews

Number of
employees

Total cost per
employee

Small:
$500,000
Medium:
$5,000,000
Large:
$50,000,000

$6,000

$2,500

1-59

$174-$8,500

Minimum
total cost as
percentage
of sales
1.70%

$10,000

$5,000

50-100

$150 - $300

0.30%

$18,000

$7.000

101+

$0.21 -$248.

0.05%

Table 2. Estimated Cost of Registration to ISO 9001 or ISO 14001, 1998.
Source: The table is based on research conducted by Johannson’s firm E2M in 1998.
Reproduced with permission.

Moreover, as we discussed earlier, certification is only one of four equally
acceptable options for demonstrating conformity to ISO 14001.130 The
EMS community needs to do a better job of communicating the message
that organizations may choose which of the four options best suits their
needs. In any case, for those that get past the certification price tag, the
next barrier to overcome relates to the typical differences between small
and large businesses’ culture and manner of operation. As it is currently
marketed by consultants, auditors, standards bodies and ISO itself, ISO
14001 is a formal management system designed by large entities based on
their own experience. By contrast, 95% of small businesses operate
informally. They are unlikely to embrace a formal environmental
management system unless there are some unequivocal signs from
business and government that they want small business, as suppliers and
taxpayers, to get on board. From a small business perspective this might
mean that the supply chain demonstrates a willingness to include the cost
of EMS implementation and maintenance in the price of products and
services, or that governments demonstrate a willingness to subsidize all or
part of such costs, so that small businesses are not left bearing the entire
burden themselves.

130

See discussion above, n. 107 and accompanying text.
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It takes time to implement an EMS. Time is a non-renewable resource for
an SME. One person spending one hour a week on an EMS can represent
3% of a very small business’s available labour,131 a substantial portion for
firms that typically operate on very small profit margins. Implementing an
EMS also takes money. If done wisely, this can be money well spent, even
for small businesses.. On a limited budget, it is wiser for the business
owner to invest in identifying environmental aspects (that is, discovering
what the company has or does that adds to its environmental footprint and
detracts from the bottom line) than an “end-of-pipe” environmental
performance audit. Some auditors provide good value in a gap analysis,
which can help the small business owner understand what the company
already does well, and where the gaps are. This can be money well spent.
Secondly, ISO and national standards bodies have not found a way to
ensure effective participation by small business in environmental
standards development. Small business participation has been a perennial
issue in TC 207, the ISO technical committee responsible for
environmental management systems. Participation by small business in
TC 207 has been woefully inadequate from the start, and many national
mirror committees have fared no better. TC 207 has, for example, had a
series of internal task forces in recent years aimed at identifying and
overcoming obstacles to SME participation in TC 207 and the
development and revision of ISO 14001. Yet these task forces have had
almost no SME representation. It has been left largely to self-selected
delegates from government, big business, certification bodies or
management consultancies to “represent” the perspectives of small
business in these processes.
The same resource, knowledge and time constraints that prevent small
business from participating effectively in national law-making activities
operate in the world of standards development. Numerous presentations
have been made at ISO meetings on the challenges faced by SMEs, but
ISO committees and central organs seem unable or unwilling to do
anything about them. And despite the widely acknowledged SME deficit
in TC 207, the few member-driven small business associations that have
actually attempted to participate, such as NORMAPME (the European
131

Assuming a micro-enterprise consisting of one person working 35 hours per week.
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Office of Crafts, Trades and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises for
Standardization), have often felt ignored, alienated and frustrated.
Just as government regulators should take smart regulation seriously,
standards development bodies should develop a better understanding of
the nature and culture of small business. They should develop a “smart”
approach to standards development and the marketing of standards to
small business. This will entail developing ways to market the key
elements of ISO 14001 to small business that will bring them the greatest
value and help them shift their businesses towards sustainability now. Just
as full compliance with all (theoretically) applicable laws is typically not
an entry level activity for small business, full EMS adoption based on the
degree of formality found in larger entities may not be the best approach
for SMEs. Management experts who understand the culture of small
enterprises agree that some increases in the degree of formality of a
business can result increased productivity.132 The optimal degree of
formality is the great unknown. What is clear, however, is that many
standards developers, consultants and auditors who market ISO 14001
presume a degree of formality far beyond what is suitable or realistic for
the vast majority of SMEs. The approach TC 207 has taken to this issue is
to initiate work on ISO 14005, a guidance standard for “phased
implementation” of ISO 14001.133 This guide is unlikely to present a
sustainable solution, however, because it fails to acknowledge some basic
facts about small business, including the relative informality of SMEs’
management systems. Instead it assumes that SMEs can ingest an
excessively formal management system simply by breaking it into pieces
to be swallowed sequentially.
In fact, experience with “staged
implementation” of EMS standards in Europe suggests that many SMEs
will not complete all stages, or will regress when government subsidies for
EMS implementation dry up. A phased implementation approach thus
risks diluting the credibility of ISO 14001, if organizations stop part way
through the process yet still attempt to claim the reputational benefits of
132

Personal communications between Johannson and representatives of the Canadian
Federation of Independent Business, NORMAPME (the European Office of Crafts,
Trades and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises for Standardization), and the US
National Federation of Independent Business (various dates).
133

ISO/CD 14005, Environmental management system — Guide for the phased
implementation of an environmental management system — Including the use of
environmental performance evaluation (Committee Draft of 2 February 2007).
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ISO 14001 adoption. Furthermore, ISO 14005 is an unwieldy and complex
document, weighing in at 81 pages in its current draft. It is far too long to
be of any use to small businesses except as a doorstop. If ISO 14005 is
published without substantial changes, it will be an embarrassment to ISO
at best, or drive an irrevocable wedge between ISO and small business at
worst.
ISO 14005 illustrates a weakness of ISO’s system for bringing forward
new standards for development. All ISO standards, and management
system standards in particular, are supposed to be developed based on a
solid understanding of market need. This should involve, at a minimum, a
demonstration of significant global demand for the proposed standard
among potential users of the standard.134 The “phased implementation”
standard reached ISO via a circuitous route, originally having been
proposed at the European level.135 No proper market justification research
was presented before ISO decided to start work on it. The research that
was proffered related to Europe, and had serious weaknesses in scope and
methodology. To critics of the phased implementation standard, including
the Canadian EMS mirror committee, the real motivation for the
development of an ISO guide on phased implementation appeared to be to
broaden the revenue base for certain standards development bodies that
had a commercial interest in the phased implementation model. One of
the main proponents of the phased implementation guide was the British
134

ISO rules require a market justification study before any new management system
standard may be developed. ISO Guide 72, Guidelines for the Justification and
Development of Management System Standards (Geneva: ISO, 2001). Guide 72, on its
face, applies to all management system standards, from guidance documents to
specification standards. When ISO 14005 was proposed, however, ISO took the position
that Guide 72 only applies to specification standards. Since ISO 14005 was only
intended as a guide, the market justification requirement did not apply.
135

Development of a phased EMS implementation standard was initially proposed, and
accepted, within CEN (Comité Européen de Normalisation), the principal European
standards development body. The proposed guide would have covered staged
implementation of EMAS and ISO 14001. Before work could begin at the European
level, CEN proposed to transfer the work item to ISO under the Vienna Agreement, an
agreement between the two organizations on technical cooperation in areas of mutual
interest. The proposal was balloted to ISO/TC 207 members, and approved by a vote of
24-7, with 5 abstentions. A new subcommittee was created within TC 207, and work
began on the phased implementation guide in 2006.
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Standards Institution (BSI). BSI had already published a British standard
on staged implementation, BS 8555.136 BSI earns revenues both from the
sale of BS 8555 and from provision of consulting services for phased EMS
implementation. BS 8555 was one of the main seed documents for the
proposed European standard on staged implementation, and the only one
forwarded to ISO/TC 207 members when the proposal was elevated to
ISO. Whatever other motivations BSI might have had, incorporation of its
phased implementation model in an ISO standard would expand the
market for its consulting services and enhance the global reach of the BSI
brand.
In short, there is reason to believe that ISO 14005 is being driven by
parochial economic interests rather than demonstrated global market
demand. Many observers and participants doubt that ISO 14005 should be
allowed to continue to drain the resources of the standards development
community. Even if it is finalized in ISO, it is not clear that it will have
any traction in North America. 137 It just does not appear to meet the needs
of North American small businesses.
In short, both governments and standards development bodies have failed
to respond adequately to the characteristics and challenges of small
business. EMS standards and EP regulations are only small manifestations
of this larger problem. In the concluding section of this article, we
speculate about where this leaves us on the path toward smart regulation
and sustainable development.

IV. CONCLUSION
The experience with the incorporation of environmental management
systems into Ontario’s environmental penalties regulations suggests six
136

BS 8555:2003, Environmental management systems — Guide to the phased
implementation of an environmental management system including the use of
environmental performance evaluation (London: British Standards Institution, 2003).
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Both Canada and the US voted against the development of the standard in ISO.
Canada decided from the start not to participate actively in the development of the
standard, and the US walked away from the development process in the summer of 2007.
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lessons about the incorporation of voluntary standards into official
regulation. First, if a standard exists that fulfills the objectives of a
proposed regulation, and the standard was developed by a recognized
standards body through a relatively robust multi-stakeholder consensus
process, regulators should incorporate the standard into the regulatory
scheme rather than re-inventing the wheel. Second, they should do so in a
way that avoids a proliferation of unexplained discrepancies between the
proposed regulation and the standard. Third, if an existing widely accepted
standard does not, on its own, meet all the public policy goals of the
proposed regulation, regulators should make it clear how the standard is
deficient and what more is required to meet public policy objectives.
Fourth, they should consult relevant standards development committees
when developing regulations. Fifth, they should, to the extent possible,
participate in the work of relevant standards development committees to
keep abreast of relevant issues and to influence the content of standards on
an ongoing basis. Finally, both regulators and standards development
bodies should address the special characteristics and challenges of the
small, medium and micro-enterprises that make up more than 95 percent
of the business community.
The first five suggestions have the potential to advance smart regulation in
modest but significant ways by – among other things – saving government
policy development costs, enlisting non-governmental expertise,
enhancing uniformity of business requirements, taking advantage of
market forces, and enhancing the reflexive capacities of regulated entities.
Our sixth suggestion, however, has truly transformative potential and
represents a fundamental challenge for both regulators and standardization
bodies. Designing and implementing regulatory systems that effectively
mobilize small business will be critical to sustainable development. While
debate continues to rage on the meaning of sustainability and sustainable
development, there is little doubt that they represent the single largest
challenge now faced by humankind. The recent media frenzy related to
one issue, climate change, has led to heightened public awareness and
concern. This has pressured politicians to put the environment high on the
policy agenda, although even with the increased political rhetoric about
climate change and the broader issue of sustainability, little if any progress
has been made.
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It is beyond the scope of an article on the incorporation of EMS standards
into a provincial environmental penalties scheme to speculate further on
what a sustainable economy might look like, or how smart regulation,
small business and sustainability relate to each other. What we can say is
that there is a sense of urgency, driven largely by those who have studied
the projections of climate change. This includes scientists, politicians and
economists who are ringing warning bells about the dire consequences of
radical shifts in our climate. This urgency will soon be intensified by a
growing number of small business owners wanting to retire. This
succession crisis will not be contained to the Canadian small business
community. Policy makers and shapers around the world, and at all levels
of government, need to understand the confluence of these issues, and how
pervasive the impacts will be.
It is possible to transform this demographic bust into an environmental
boon, but we have a very small window of opportunity to respond to the
challenge. Whether it is climate change, small business succession or
sustainable development generally, the window for effective action will
close in the next few years. The next two to three years are probably the
most critical, putting the challenge well within the planning horizons of
today’s politicians and investors. This should be some reason to hope that
action will be taken, but the magnitude of the challenges should not be
underestimated.

